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Intrinsic fingerprinting is a class of digital forensic technology that can detect
traces left in digital multimedia data in order to reveal data processing history and
determine data integrity. Many existing intrinsic fingerprinting schemes have implic-
itly assumed favorable operating conditions whose validity may become uncertain in
reality. In order to establish intrinsic fingerprinting as a credible approach to digital
multimedia authentication, it is important to understand and enhance its resiliency
under unfavorable scenarios.
This dissertation addresses various resiliency aspects that can appear in a
broad range of intrinsic fingerprints. The first aspect concerns intrinsic fingerprints
that are designed to identify a particular component in the processing chain. Such
fingerprints are potentially subject to changes due to input content variations and/or
post-processing, and it is desirable to ensure their identifiability in such situations.
Taking an image-based intrinsic fingerprinting technique for source camera model
identification as a representative example, our investigations reveal that the finger-
prints have a substantial dependency on image content. Such dependency limits the
achievable identification accuracy, which is penalized by a mismatch between train-
ing and testing image content. To mitigate such a mismatch, we propose schemes to
incorporate image content into training image selection and significantly improve the
identification performance. We also consider the effect of post-processing against in-
trinsic fingerprinting, and study source camera identification based on imaging noise
extracted from low-bit-rate compressed videos. While such compression reduces the
fingerprint quality, we exploit different compression levels within the same video to
achieve more efficient and accurate identification.
The second aspect of resiliency addresses anti-forensics, namely, adversarial
actions that intentionally manipulate intrinsic fingerprints. We investigate the cost-
effectiveness of anti-forensic operations that counteract color interpolation identi-
fication. Our analysis pinpoints the inherent vulnerabilities of color interpolation
identification, and motivates countermeasures and refined anti-forensic strategies.
We also study the anti-forensics of an emerging space-time localization technique for
digital recordings based on electrical network frequency analysis. Detection schemes
against anti-forensic operations are devised under a mathematical framework. For
both problems, game-theoretic approaches are employed to characterize the inter-
play between forensic analysts and adversaries and to derive optimal strategies.
The third aspect regards the resilient and robust representation of intrinsic
fingerprints for multiple forensic identification tasks. We propose to use the empir-
ical frequency response as a generic type of intrinsic fingerprint that can facilitate
the identification of various linear and shift-invariant (LSI) and non-LSI operations.
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1.1 Digital Multimedia Authentication using Intrinsic Fingerprinting
Recent advancement of multimedia and communications technologies has sig-
nificantly facilitated the creation and distribution of digital multimedia data, such
as images, videos, and music. Compared to multimedia signals in analog forms,
digital multimedia data have the significant advantages of easy acquisition, storage,
and transmission, and therefore have been widely used in various applications where
multimedia content is involved.
Along with the growing importance of digital multimedia data, concerns re-
garding their misuse have also been raised and are receiving increasing attention.
In particular, the digital nature of such data makes them easy targets for manip-
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ulations, and a large amount of data have been found tampered or forged so as
to convey misleading or false messages [22]. In order to establish the credibility of
digital multimedia data, it is crucial to devise mechanisms that can examine their
integrity or further infer the processing history that they have gone through. Many
solutions have been proposed in the recent literature toward ensuring that digital
multimedia data are used in a trustworthy and authorized manner. In this disserta-
tion, we focus on one particular class of strategies, commonly referred to as intrinsic
fingerprinting. Intrinsic fingerprinting [21, 24, 52, 70] aims at exploiting certain “in-
trinsic traces” that have been left in the digital multimedia signal as it undergoes a
processing pipeline. Such traces can be used to expose certain properties or patterns
introduced by user manipulations, and thus are helpful in assessing the integrity of
multimedia data.
1.2 How Resilient are Intrinsic Fingerprints?
Among various intrinsic fingerprinting techniques that have been designed and
experimentally tested by the research community, many are based on statistical
traces originated from certain signal characteristics that are subtle in nature. Fig. 1.1
illustrates a general setting of intrinsic fingerprinting. The source signal undergoes a
chain of n1 processing modules and reaches the point A. Intrinsic fingerprints created
in this processing chain may be estimated by examining the features derived from
the signal at A. In reality, however, extra post-processing may be performed after A,
and only the final output at the point B is available for forensic feature extraction
2
Figure 1.1: A typical setting of intrinsic fingerprint extraction and matching.
and matching. Even if the processing chain to be identified is kept unchanged,
the extracted forensic features may depend on attributes of the source signal and
are subject to changes if the post-processing causes the signals at points A and B
to be different. It is therefore desirable that intrinsic fingerprints can be robustly
identified against a variety of content characteristics and post-processing.
In addition, intrinsic fingerprints may also be extracted and matched in the
presence of adversaries that are motivated to perform certain “anti-forensic” oper-
ations so as to counteract or mislead forensic analysis. Compared to the aforemen-
tioned content variations or post-processing, anti-forensics involves manipulations of
the intrinsic fingerprints that are conducted by the adversaries. Therefore, resilient
intrinsic fingerprinting against anti-forensics should take into account the interac-
tion between forensic analysts and adversaries, and suitable countermeasures should
be devised accordingly.
Finally, for many current intrinsic fingerprinting systems, the employed intrin-
sic fingerprints are tailored to particular forensic tasks such as JPEG compression or
filtering. As such, multiple forensic features may need to be computed and matched
in order to identify a processing module that is unknown to a forensic analyst. Such
computation can be costly and reduce the practical usability of intrinsic fingerprints,
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and another aspect of resiliency concerns finding an intrinsic fingerprint that can
identify a wide range of processing modules.
1.3 Main Contributions and Dissertation Organization
In order to improve the foundation and practical usability of intrinsic finger-
printing, this dissertation addresses several resiliency aspects of intrinsic fingerprint-
ing. In particular, we examine current intrinsic fingerprinting schemes in terms of
their resiliency to possible sources of fingerprint distortions, and propose solutions
for resiliency enhancement.
1.3.1 Imaging Device Identification against Content Dependency and
Post-Processing
Information about imaging mechanisms of digital images and videos carry use-
ful clues about their origin, and therefore can serve as important intrinsic fingerprints
for forensic analysis. However, most research so far has assumed that these finger-
prints are extracted under favorable conditions, such as with controlled image/video
content, native spatial resolution, and light to moderate compression. When such
conditions are not met, it is still unclear how well the extracted fingerprints can
be used to match the imaging mechanisms. In this dissertation, we investigate the
resiliency of imaging device identification based on color interpolation and imaging
noise traces against content dependency and post-processing. First, we show that
the color interpolation coefficients that were proposed to represent the color inter-
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polation algorithms have a substantial dependency on the image content. Such a
dependency may cause mismatch between the coefficients estimated from training
and testing data, and therefore reduce the identification accuracy. In order to mit-
igate the mismatch, we propose profiles that can be efficiently calculated from the
image and can represent the image content, and then propose training image selec-
tion schemes based on these profiles for configuring a suitable classifier that employs
training images whose content match the testing image so that the identification is
significantly improved.
We also show that such post-processing as strong compression that can be
found in low-bit-rate video applications has a considerable impact on the accuracy
of camera unit identification using the Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)
derived from imaging noise. As such, strong compression poses challenges to video-
based camera unit identification as low-bit-rate videos become increasingly prevail-
ing. Nevertheless, we have found that even within the same video, the compression
level actually depends on the frame type, and by properly exploiting the differ-
ence in compression levels during the training and testing phases, we can achieve a
substantially higher identification accuracy.
1.3.2 Anti-Forensics and Countermeasures of Color Interpolation Iden-
tification and Electrical Network Frequency Analysis
Anti-forensic operations intentionally manipulate the fingerprint extraction
and matching, and can undermine the effectiveness of intrinsic fingerprinting. In this
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dissertation, we examine the resiliency against anti-forensics of two types of intrinsic
fingerprinting: 1) color interpolation identification, which is a core technique used in
camera model identification, and 2) electrical network frequency analysis for space-
time localization of digital recordings.
We first investigate plausible anti-forensic operations that can be performed
by such adversaries as pirate camera manufacturers. These operations include pa-
rameter perturbation that circumvents the identification of targeted interpolation
algorithms, and algorithm mixing that can mislead the identification toward a spe-
cific wrong result. Our findings provide insights into the vulnerabilities of color
interpolation identification based on gradient direction classification, and such in-
sights motivate forensic analysts to take countermeasures, which may in turns be
countered by adversaries’ follow-up actions. We characterize such a dynamic inter-
play using game-theoretic techniques, and derive the optimal strategies that both
sides are willing to adopt.
We then explore the anti-forensics of a recently developed class of space-time
localization techniques based on the electrical network frequency (ENF). These tech-
niques extract the ENF signal from a sensor recording and compare it to the ref-
erences measured from the power mains to determine the creation time and region
of the recording. While this technique has received increasing attention lately, its
resiliency against anti-forensics has not been investigated. We establish a mathe-
matical framework that can characterize plausible anti-forensic operations for ENF
signal manipulations. This framework also motivates countermeasures against anti-
forensic operations. We further consider possible improvements over anti-forensics
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that may evade the detection, which consequently call for refined forensic detection
schemes. Such an interplay between forensic analysts and adversaries can be viewed
from an evolutionary perspective and a game-theoretic perspective, and we study
representative cases to obtain a quantitative understanding of such an interplay and
to obtain optimal forensic analysis strategies.
1.3.3 Empirical Frequency Responses as Generic Intrinsic Finger-
prints
In addition to determine the creation mechanism and time of digital multi-
media data, another important goal of intrinsic fingerprinting is to discover the
processing history that the multimedia data has undergone. As discussed earlier,
current intrinsic fingerprints are often tailored to recognizing particular processing
modules, and often fail when applied to other modules. Even if multiple fingerprints
can be extracted and matched, they may still be unable to accommodate unforeseen
operations. This leads to significant computational burden and limited effectiveness
for forensic analysis.
We propose in this dissertation to use the empirical frequency response (EFR)
as a generic intrinsic fingerprint. We show that many classes of image processing
operations, either linear and shift-invariant (LSI) or non-LSI, such as resampling,
JPEG compression, and non-linear filtering, exhibit distinctive patterns in their
EFRs and therefore can be identified using the EFR representation. The EFR can
also be used for other use in forensics. For example, we have found that EFR has
7
some dependency on the model of the camera that is used to generate an image,
and such dependency can facilitate camera model identification.
1.3.4 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we investigate
the content dependency of camera model identification based on color interpolation
identification. To mitigate the penalty incurred by the mismatch between training
and testing images, we propose profiles that can be used to represent the image
content type, and training image selection schemes that can automatically determine
the training images that match the testing image.
In Chapter 3, we study another aspect of color interpolation identification,
namely, its resiliency to anti-forensic operations including parameter perturbation
and algorithm mixing. Our analysis sheds light on the inherent vulnerabilities of
current color interpolation identification schemes. We propose a color interpolation
identification game to characterize such an interplay between forensic analysts and
adversaries.
In Chapter 4, we continue to investigate the impact of anti-forensics when
applied to a recent time-stamping technique based on the electrical network fre-
quency (ENF). We show that certain anti-forensic operations can manipulate the
ENF signal, which can be detected under our mathematical framework by examin-
ing appropriate types of consistency. Improvements by adversaries as well as refined
forensic techniques can arise from an evolutionary perspective. We characterize such
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a dynamic interaction using game-theoretic techniques, and quantitatively evaluate
representative scenarios and determine the optimal strategies.
In Chapter 5, we study the resiliency of intrinsic fingerprints against post-
processing and present a case study of imaging-noise-based camera identification
using strongly compressed videos. As such compression reduces the identification
performance, we show that within the same video there exists different levels of
compression, which can be leveraged to improve the identification using a fixed
number of video frames.
In Chapter 6, we consider the applicability of intrinsic fingerprints to a wide
range of forensic tasks, and propose to use the empirical frequency response (EFR)
as a generic intrinsic fingerprint. We show that the EFR can identify processing
modules that are either linear and shift-invariant (LSI) or non-LSI and can facilitate
the identification of camera models.
Finally, we conclude in Chapter 7 this dissertation and outline research issues
that can be explored in the future.
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CHAPTER 2
Content Awareness for Camera Model Identification
2.1 Chapter Introduction
In the past decade, the rapid advancement of digital photography, storage, and
Internet technologies has boosted the ubiquitous use of digital images in today’s
society. In the meantime, since digital images are vulnerable to software editing
and manipulations, increasing attention has also been brought to concerns regarding
their origin and integrity. One can readily ask a series of questions about a given
digital image: for example, what kind of acquisition device was used to generate
this image? If the image was taken by a camera, what is the make and model of the
camera? Has this image undergone any non-trivial post-processing or manipulation?
All these questions lie under the umbrella of digital image forensics, which
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has become a very active research area in recent years. Extensive efforts have led
to a number of promising techniques and tools. Fridrich et al. [24] developed the
methodology of exploiting the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) to distin-
guish different camera units. Swaminathan et al. [67] showed how to employ color
interpolation coefficients robustly and use them to identify different camera models.
Also, they employed blind deconvolution to estimate a linear and shift-invariant
(LSI) approximation of the overall post-processing step and the LSI estimate will
be matched against an identity system to determine if there is any non-trivial ma-
nipulation [68]. Popescu and Farid [57] estimated the inter-pixel correlation caused
by interpolation for detecting rescaling operations. Farid et al. leveraged physics-
based properties such as lighting and reflection to identify image forgeries [31, 32].
Ng et al. [52] also proposed physics-motivated features to separate realistic photos
and computer graphics. Toward a unifying understanding of digital image forensics,
a framework of component forensics has been established [70] for the study of more
generic scenarios. In parallel to establishing forensic techniques, efforts of anti foren-
sics have also been made to examine their vulnerability as well as countermeasures
to intentional attacks [64].
In this chapter, we consider the problem of camera model identification that
matches digital images against potential models of camera sources. This problem
finds its applications in many forensic and homeland security scenarios. For example,
a forensic analyst during a crime-scene investigation may find a cell-phone left in
the scene. Using existing forensic tools such as the Universal Forensic Extraction
Device from CelleBrite Mobile [48], the analyst can extract data from the cell-phone
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including the user contacts, call history, text messages, and all the images stored on
the cell-phone. Among these data, the images taken using the cell-phone’s built-in
camera potentially sketch what the victim may have seen in his or her last minutes.
However, before such images become eligible for forensic evidence, their integrity
first has to be established. The analyst can first check whether or not the images
are from the exact cell-phone camera that is found, and this can be accomplished
using techniques such as the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [24] that
captures the camera-specific characteristics. In the case when the images are not
from the exact cell-phone camera, it becomes crucial to identify the underlying
camera models associated with the images so that the analyst can infer further the
images’ possible origin.
In the forensic literature, there have been a good number of techniques devoted
to camera model identification. One class of techniques approach this goal by iden-
tifying the underlying color interpolation algorithm that a digital camera has used
to create an image [10,67]. Color interpolation is a common step in digital photog-
raphy that has a crucial impact on the quality of resulting images [40]. As different
camera manufacturers compete with customized color interpolation algorithms to
enhance visual quality, it has been shown that the make and model of the source
camera can be inferred from the underlying color interpolation algorithm [10,17,67].
While promising results have demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach, we
show in this chapter that the achievable identification performance has a substantial
dependency on the types of image content. Based on the scheme proposed in [67],
we provide a detailed investigation of such content dependency. Both experimental
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and analytical studies suggest that the image-extracted color interpolation param-
eters have different statistical distributions with respect to image content. As a
result, image content plays a role in the achievable identification performance, and
the performance can be penalized if there exists mismatch between the content of
images used during training and testing phases. Such an understanding can not
only provide a rule of thumb for manually selecting proper training images, but also
lead to automatic training image selection schemes proposed in this chapter. By
automatically incorporating content awareness into the selection of training images,
we can save the workload of tedious training image selection saved, and improve the
identification performance for both seen and unseen image content. Finally, as con-
tent dependency is an inherent issue that can occur in other identification schemes,
we expect that the proposed content-aware methodology will have a broader impact
and more upcoming applications.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the basics
of camera model identification based on the traces of color interpolation. Section 2.3
investigates the content dependency of camera model identification. The developed
understanding of content dependency is then applied in Section 2.4 to implement
content-aware selection of training images. Section 2.5 proposes the profile-based
adaptive training to further exploits content awareness. Section 2.6 considers the
extension of the proposed selection schemes to other types of image content. Sec-
tion 4.7 summarizes this chapter.
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2.2 Camera Model Identification using Color Interpolation Traces
2.2.1 Color Interpolation in Digital Imaging Pipeline
Most digital cameras in today’s consumer market follow a similar imaging
pipeline as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Light reflected from the real-world scene passes
through the optical components and is then detected by an array of sensors. As
the sensors are only capable of detecting the light intensity, in order to acquire
color information, a color filter array (CFA) is employed to filter the lights and
selectively allows a certain color component of light, commonly either red, green,
or blue, to reach the sensors. A predetermined CFA pattern dictates what color
component is allowed to pass at each sensor, and this pattern contains usually
a periodic repetition of the 2 × 2 Bayer pattern or its shifted variants shown in
Fig. 2.2. Once the data obtained from the CFA is available, the intermediate pixel
values lost in color sensing are interpolated using its neighboring pixel values by
an operation commonly known as color interpolation or demosaicing. Following
color interpolation is a post-processing stage, in which various types of in-camera
processing operations such as white balancing, gamma correction, and compression
may be performed to enhance the overall picture quality and/or to reduce storage
demand. The result of the post-processing stage is the final camera output.
Since a substantial amount of color information is lost in terms of spatial
resolution during color acquisition, color interpolation has a crucial impact on the
quality of final image outputs [40] and has been an active research area in image
processing. Detailed surveys and comparisons of color interpolation techniques can
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Figure 2.1: The Imaging Model Inside Digital Cameras.
Figure 2.2: Bayer pattern and its shifted variants.
be found in [2, 40]. The algorithms in the literature range from non-adaptive ones
with low complexity such as bilinear or bicubic interpolation to highly adaptive and
complex ones that can better capture the underlying image structure and recover
the lost color information. Different camera manufacturers customize color interpo-
lation algorithms to enhance visual quality, and therefore it has been found that the
source camera make and model can be effectively identified by first determining the
underlying color interpolation algorithm [10, 67].
2.2.2 Existing Identification Schemes
A few prior works have studied how to identify the underlying color inter-
polation algorithm of a camera-generated image [5, 10, 57, 67]. In a nutshell, these
works consider different parametric models that can characterize a variety of color
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interpolation algorithms, and the parameters associated with a particular algorithm
are estimated using sample images processed by the algorithm. These parametric
models differ in their trade-offs between flexibility and complexity, namely, how well
they can approximate a given color interpolation algorithm versus how much data is
needed for parameter estimation. The works in [5,57] use expectation-maximization
(EM) techniques to compute a set of weights for classifying several color interpola-
tion algorithms. Quadratic pixel correlation coefficients are employed in [41] as color
interpolation traces for camera model identification. The work in [67] proposes a
region-wise linear interpolation framework in which pixels are grouped into different
directional regions and pixels belonging to the same region share the same linear
interpolation. The CFA pattern and the linear interpolation coefficients associated
with each region can be jointly estimated using least-squares methods. In [10], a
partial derivative correlation model is introduced to incorporate the higher-order
relation among pixels as well as the cross-color channel correlations that are not
explicitly addressed in [67]. The parameters of this model can also be estimated by
an EM algorithm [10].
Among these existing works, the scheme proposed by Swaminathan et al. [67]
is one of the earliest that incorporates the concept of direction-adaptive interpolation
and has been shown to have a promising identification performance [17]. This scheme
has also been used as a building block to regularize the behavior of blind image
deconvolution using the color interpolation regularity [68]. Despite the promising
identification accuracy reported in previous works, we shall show in this chapter that
the achievable accuracy has a substantial dependency on the content of the sample
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images. We investigate such content dependency through both experimental studies
and analytical justifications, and demonstrate how the identification performance
can be improved by properly incorporating the content dependency into identifier
design.
2.2.3 Refined Color Interpolation Identification Scheme based on Swami-
nathan et al. [67]
To study the content dependency of color interpolation identification, we im-
plement the identification scheme proposed by Swaminathan et al. [67], which is one
of the earliest works that incorporates the concept of direction-adaptive interpola-
tion and has been shown to have a promising identification performance. To better
reflect the state of the art, we improve this scheme by refining its directional clas-
sification rules for higher identification accuracy. Specifically, let Ix,y represent the
sensor value at location (x, y). The local gradient profile along different directions


























Hx,y = |Ix,y−2 + Ix,y+2 − Ix,y|,
Vx,y = |Ix−2,y + Ix+2,y − Ix,y|,
Dx,y = |Ix−2,y−2 + Ix+2,y+2 − Ix,y|,
Ax,y = |Ix−2,y+2 + Ix+2,y−2 − Ix,y|.
Each pixel at location (x, y) is classified into one of five directional regions
that are preset using two thresholds T1 and T2. As illustrated in Fig. 2.3, Region
R1 contains pixels satisfying Hx,y − Vx,y > T1, i.e., pixels with a significant hori-
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zontal gradient; Region R2 has pixels satisfying Vx,y −Hx,y > T1, i.e., pixels with a
significant vertical gradient. Similarly, Region R3 contains pixels with a significant
anti-diagonal gradient satisfying Ax,y − Dx,y > T2, and Region R4 contains pixels
with a significant diagonal gradient satisfying Dx,y − Ax,y > T2. Pixels not in any
of the above are assigned to Region R5, which mainly come from smooth areas.
With a given CFA pattern, the set of locations in each color channel that are
acquired directly from the sensor array can be determined. By approximating the
remaining pixels to be interpolated with a set of linear equations in terms of the col-
ors of directly-captured pixels, we can obtain a set of linear equations corresponding
to each directional region (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5) in each color channel (red, green,
and blue). Let each set of equations for a particular directional region and color
channel be represented by
Ax = b. (2.1)
This set of equations can be solved for the linear interpolation coefficients and the
resulting interpolation error using the least-squares method. Specifically, the least-
squares solution to the above equation set is given by
x̂ = A+b = (ATA)−1ATb.
The obtained color interpolation coefficients can then be used to reconstruct the
image. For each CFA pattern, one can calculate the reconstruction error, and the
optimal CFA pattern and color interpolation coefficients are jointly selected as the
combination that yields the lowest reconstruction error.
Thus, from each image, we can obtain a vector of estimated color interpo-
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Figure 2.3: Pixel classification based on local gradient.
lation coefficients, which can be subsequently used as features for camera model
identification. Although one can apply dimensionality reduction to reduce the fea-
ture dimension, we use the estimated color interpolation coefficients as raw features
to illustrate some statistical properties that are crucial in this chapter. Finally,
machine learning techniques, such as the probabilistic Support Vector Machine [77]
adopted in this chapter, can then be employed on the features to construct camera
model identifiers.
2.3 Content Dependency of Camera Model Identification
2.3.1 Accuracies of Camera Model Identification under Various Con-
tent Conditions
We use 16 different cell-phone camera models listed in Table 5.1 to examine
the accuracy of our refined camera model identification scheme. Note that we will
use “camera” and “camera model” interchangeably for convenience. It is worth
pointing out that a good number of cell-phone cameras are included in this chapter.
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These cameras range from low-end products (for example, Samsung SPH-i700) to
more recent releases (for example, Apple iPhone4), and thus our study also sheds
light on the camera model identification capability on cell-phone devices in today’s
consumer market.
With each camera, we have taken 100 images of diverse content as a way to
sample the scenes in our environment. These 100 images can be roughly grouped into
two types of scene. Fifty images of the first type (called “Type I”) are in essence
natural scenes taken outdoors with substantial texture regions made of natural
materials such as trees, leaves, or grass. Fifty images of the other type (called “Type
II”) are basically man-made scenes that contain man-made structures mostly taken
indoors. Typical examples of these two types of scenes are shown in Fig. 2.4(a) and
2.4(b), respectively. From each image, a block of 512× 512 pixels is extracted from
which the color interpolation coefficients are estimated and used as the features for
camera model identification. We employ the standard probabilistic SVM with cross
validation to train a 16-class camera model identifier [67].
In order to understand the effect of content dependency, we explicitly separate
Type I and Type II scenes to form different combinations of training and testing
settings and observe the respective identification performances. Fig. 2.5 shows six
different training-testing data pairs and the corresponding camera model identifi-
cation accuracy for different numbers of training image blocks. Note that for the
training setting denoted by “Mixture”, Type I and Type II scenes are uniformly
mixed from which a specified number of training images are selected for training.
As we can see, the highest accuracy of around 99.55% is obtained when Type I scenes
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Table 2.1: Cell-Phone Camera Models Used for Model Identification Experiment
Index Camera model Index Camera model
1 Sony Ericsson W810i 9 Samsung SCH-i760
2 Sony Ericsson W760a 10 Samsung A707
3 Sony Ericsson W705a 11 Samsung SPH-i700
4 LG VX-9700 12 Nokia E71x
5 LG VX-8550 13 Nokia 6650d
6 LG VX-8100 14 Blackberry Bold 9700
7 Apple iPhone 3G 15 Motorola Cliq
8 Apple iPhone 4 16 HTC Apache
(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: A typical Type I scene (a) and a typical Type II scene (b) in our
experiment.
21

























(A) Train: Type I / Test: Type I
(B) Train: Both Types / Test: Type I
(C) Train: Type II / Test: Type II
(D) Train: Both Types / Test: Type II
(E) Train: Type II / Test: Type I







Figure 2.5: Testing accuracies for different combinations of training / testing data.
are used both for training and testing. However, the accuracy drops drastically to
only 63.28% as we use a classifier trained with Type I scenes for training and test
with Type II scenes. If we instead use Type II scenes for training, we can obtain
an accuracy of 88.08% when Type I scenes are tested and 93.58% when Type II
scenes are tested, respectively. Such a trend is essentially consistent as the number
of training images grows.
The identification results shown in Fig. 2.5 have two implications. First, the
identification accuracy is penalized if the training image data and the testing image
data do not match in terms of their content. Second, camera model identification
using Type II scene images appears to be more difficult compared to using Type I
scene images. It is of interest to investigate the underlying reasons for these findings,
to which we take a statistical approach in the next subsection.
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2.3.2 Distributions of Coefficient Estimates Associated with Differ-
ent Scenes
With each image block, we obtain a vector consisting of the estimates for the
color interpolation coefficients, and study the distribution of the coefficient estimates
due to content dependency. We calculate the statistics of the coefficients estimates,
including the mean and variance, in order to understand if Type I and II scenes lead
to distinct distributions.
We first compare the mean coefficient estimates associated with Type I and II
scenes using the two-sample t-test [19], which is a statistical tool for determining if
two sets have different mean values. For two given sets of one-dimensional samples
{xi} and {yi}, the hypothesis test can be formulated as
H0 : x̄i = ȳi
H1 : x̄i 6= ȳi
with respect to a given significance level, i.e., a probability threshold below which H0
will be rejected. For multi-dimensional samples, we define the strength of mean-value
difference as the percentage of dimensions on which the hypothesis H0 is rejected
(i.e., the two sets have distinct mean values over the particular dimension). For a
significance level of 0.05, we show in Fig. 2.6 the strength of mean-value difference
between opposite types of scene (that is, Type I versus II), as well as the strength
of mean-value difference between complementary subsets of the same type of scene,
repeated for each camera. It can be seen that the strength of mean-value difference
is consistently larger when we consider coefficient estimates from opposite types
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between Type I and Type II scenes
within the same scene type
Figure 2.6: Strength of mean-value difference of coefficient estimates per camera.
For multi-dimensional features, the strength is defined as the percentage of dimen-
sions on which H0 is rejected, i.e., the mean values are distinct over the particular
dimension.
of scenes, suggesting that the two types of scenes have unequal mean coefficient
estimates.
We also examine the variance of coefficient estimates associated with Type I
and II scenes. For each camera, we average the variance of coefficient estimates over
each dimension, which is shown in Fig. 2.7(a). It can be seen that the variance of
coefficient estimates associated with Type I and II scenes are significantly different.
In particular, for each camera under consideration, the coefficient estimates from
Type I scenes have a smaller variance than those from Type II scenes. Such a
difference can also be observed by calculating the variance associated with individual
directional regions (R1 to R5) in Type I and II scenes, as shown in Fig. 2.7(b). The
variance associated with Type I scenes is consistently lower in all directional regions
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with a clear margin.
2.3.3 Impact of Characteristics of Type I and II Scenes on Coefficient
Estimation
Once we see the differences in the mean and variance of coefficient estimates
associated with different scenes, it is of interest to obtain a deeper understand-
ing of such differences as well as their impacts. We explore here the fundamental
characteristics of Type I and II scenes that lead to such differences, and how the
identification of camera model identification is impacted.
The difference in the mean coefficient estimate can be attributed to estima-
tion bias, which arises as an adaptive color interpolation is approximated by the
directional linear interpolation model. The ad-hoc partitioning of pixels into a fixed
number of directional regions may not perfectly match the underlying interpolation
algorithm, and hence each directional region may contain pixels that fit the region
to different extents. Such limited fitting of directional regions makes the coefficient
estimates biased, and the extent of bias depends on the overall composition of pix-
els, which is controlled by the scene type of images. This suggests the difference in
mean coefficient estimates associated with different scenes, and is consistent with
our result of the two-sample t-test.
The difference in the variance of coefficient estimates can be understood as
follows. After all pixels are assigned into one of the directional regions, each pixel
contributes to its directional region a linear equation that encodes the relation be-
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Figure 2.7: (a) Variance of coefficient estimates per camera. (b) Variance of coeffi-
cient estimates per directional region.
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tween the pixel and its neighbors, in terms of the color interpolation coefficients.
For each directional region R in each color channel C, the variance of the coefficient
estimate is determined by two factors: the variability of the solution when an indi-
vidual equation is solved, denoted by σ2(R,C), as well as the number of equations
available for each directional region, denoted by N(R,C). N(R,C) can be directly
calculated, whose average values for different (R,C) are plotted in Fig. 2.8. We can
see that in Type I scene images, much more pixels are assigned into R1 to R4. To
estimate σ2(R,C), we calculate the variance of coefficient estimates when an upper
threshold is placed for the number of equations used for coefficient estimation. Note
that the exact number of equations used in the estimation can be smaller than the
threshold, but is equal or close to the threshold when the threshold is small. For
illustration, we plot in Fig. 2.9 this variance with respect to different thresholds
for two directional regions, R1 and R5 of the red channel. It can be seen that: 1)
the variance decreases with respect to the threshold; 2) for the same number of
equations, which coincides with smaller thresholds, coefficient estimates from Type
I scenes have lower variance. This holds regardless of the directional region, and
implies that σ2(R,C) associated with Type I scenes is larger than that associated
with Type II scenes. Furthermore, the effect of σ2(R,C) is more dominant than
that of N(R,C). In particular, although more equations are available in R5 of Type
II scenes, the variance associated R5 in Type I scenes is still lower.
The difference in N(R,C) and σ2(R,C) between Type I and II scenes can be
attributed to the fundamental difference of these scenes in terms of the gradient
distributions shown in Fig. 2.10. Recall that Type I scenes are essentially natural
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Figure 2.8: Number of equations per directional region.
scenes while Type II scenes are essentially man-made structures (see Fig. 2.4). The
gradient of Type I scenes has more large values compared to that of the Type II
scenes, which is expected since Type II scenes have significant portions of smooth
areas without large variations. Consequently, more pixels in Type I images will be
assigned to Ri (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), leading to larger N(R,C). On the other hand, larger
pixel-value variations in Type I scenes impose more constraints on the inter-pixel
relations; therefore, individual equations have more consistent solutions and thus
σ2(R,C) is smaller. One effective measurement of the solution’s consistency of the
equations is the condition number [76]. A widely adopted definition of the condition
number is the ratio of the maximal singular value of the matrix A in (2.1) to the
minimal one. The smaller the condition number is, the more consistent a solution
is. We plot for illustration the average condition number with respect to different
equation number thresholds for R1 and R5 in the red channel, in Fig. 2.11, where
the substantial margin between Type I and II scenes confirms the aforementioned
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difference in solution consistency.
Our findings above suggest that coefficient estimates associated with Type I
and II scenes have unequal values of mean and variance. In other words, Type I and
II scenes lead to different distributions of coefficient estimates. A direct consequence
of this difference is that the identification accuracy will be penalized if the content
of the training and the testing images do not match. Furthermore, the substantial
difference in the variance associated with Type I and Type II scenes explains why the
identification accuracy is lower when Type II scenes are used. One way to predict the
identification performance is to jointly estimate the between-camera scatter, which
is defined as the average difference between mean coefficient estimates associated
with individual cameras, and the within-camera scatter, which is represented by
the average variance of the coefficient estimates associated with individual cameras.
Whereas the between-camera scatters for Type I and II scenes are close to each other
and differ by only 5%, the within-camera scatter for Type I scenes is consistently
and substantially lower than that for Type II scenes, as shown in Fig. 2.7. In other
words, the coefficient estimates associated with Type I scenes are more consistent
and form a denser distribution, making it easier to distinguish different cameras
when only Type I scene images are considered. Conversely, estimates associated
with Type II scenes are less consistent and spread more widely; they are more likely






























































Figure 2.9: (a) Variance of coefficient estimates with respect to the equation number
threshold (R1 in red channel). (b) Variance of coefficient estimates with respect to
the equation number threshold (R5 in red channel).
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Figure 2.10: Gradient distributions of Type I and Type II scenes.
2.4 Content-Aware Selection of Training Images
2.4.1 Semi Non-Intrusive Training for Completely Non-Intrusive Test-
ing
Our investigation in Section 2.3 suggests the substantial content dependency
of camera model identification, and such dependency can degrade the achievable
identification performance. In many forensic scenarios involving camera model iden-
tification, the analyst has no control over the images to be matched against a target
camera, but with the camera at hand, he/she is able to specify the training process.
Specifically, the forensic analyst is provided with the extra freedom of generating
and selecting training images that match the testing image, so as to mitigate the
content mismatch problem. Note that in reality, it may be difficult to evaluate
certain quantitative properties of a scene during the collection process of training
































































(b) Smooth region R5 in red channel
Figure 2.11: (a) Average condition number with respect to the equation number
threshold for R1 in red channel; (b) Average condition number with respect to the
equation number threshold for R5 in red channel.
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testing images using a given quantitative measure, unless some built-in functionali-
ties or feedback channels via the network infrastructure are available. Alternatively,
we assume in this chapter that a “super set” of training images is first collected
without full awareness of the image content (the rule of thumb above is still useful).
Proper training images that are tailored to the testing images are then selected off-
line. In order to capture the variations of coefficient estimates, Section 2.3 shows
that training data should include a sufficient number of Type II scenes. In addition,
a small number of Type I images should also be included so that the camera model
can be accurately identified using images of the Type I scene.
2.4.2 Fitness Evaluation of Training Images
The aforementioned finding can be used as a rule of thumb to guide the col-
lection process of training image data. In reality, however, a hard division of image
content into Type I and II scenes is not always straightforward, and ambiguity can
easily arise for images with mixed content. [56]. More than that, it is a heavy bur-
den to manually select training images that belong to a particular type of scene. In
view of these two reasons, it is desirable to avoid the hard and manual division of
training images.
In order to select training images automatically in terms of their content char-
acteristics, we need to define: 1) image representations that stand for the image
content and 2) quantitative measures that evaluate the similarity between two con-
tent representations. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, training images should match
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the statistical distribution of the testing images. However, properties such as mean
and variance are the ensemble statistics calculated over multiple images, and cannot
be directly obtained with individual ones. Nevertheless, our observations made in
Section 2.3.2 suggest several possible “profiles” that can be immediately extracted
from each image to represent their content. Specifically, we propose and examine
the region partitioning profile (RPP) and the condition number profile (CNP). The
RPP is defined as the concatenation of the numbers of pixels that are grouped into
the 15 directional regions (R1 to R5 in red, green, and blue channels). The CNP
is defined similarly as the concatenation of the condition numbers associated with
the 15 directional regions. Clearly, these two profiles can be evaluated from each
individual image. Once these profiles are defined, we adopt in this chapter the
Euclidean distance between two profiles as a measure of the content dissimilarity
between two images.
2.4.3 Selection Strategies
We examine here if the accuracy of camera model identification can be im-
proved by incorporating the content awareness of training images. Toward this end,
we consider several different settings that correspond to different levels of content
awareness:
• Blind Content Selection: Fifty Type I and fifty Type II scene images from each
camera are mixed into the super set of training images. A subset of training
images is blindly selected and used to construct a camera model identifier.
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• Manual Content Selection: Training images in the super set are classified
manually as Type I and Type II ones. Two camera model identifiers are then
constructed using the Type I and Type II scene images, respectively. The
same manual content classification is also conducted for the testing image and
the appropriate camera model identifier is selected accordingly.
• Automatic Content Clustering Using the Proposed Profiles : Using either the
RPP or CNP to represent a training image, we calculate the Euclidean distance
between any two training images as their dissimilarity. A K-means clustering
procedure for 2-class is then conducted over the entire super set to automati-
cally partition the training images into two clusters. We expect that the two
clusters correspond to Type I and Type II scene images, respectively.
We use two image sets as the super sets to examine various strategies for
training image selection. In addition to the set generated by the 16 cell-phone
cameras as listed in Section 2.3.1, we create a super set that consists of images that
have been explicitly color interpolated using 8 different interpolation algorithms: the
first six are well known algorithms, including bilinear, bicubic, smooth hue, median
filter based, gradient based, and an adaptive color plane algorithm [2]. In recent
years, significant progress has been made to improve the reconstruction quality of
color interpolation. To reflect the advancement of the state of the art, we also
include a recent algorithm based on local polynomial approximation (LPA) and
intersection of confidence intervals (ICI) [55], which performs well in a comparative
survey [40], and a latest algorithm that combines local directional interpolation
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(LDI) and nonlocal adaptive thresholding (NAT) [80]. The same composition of
Type I and Type II scene images, namely 50 Type I scene and 50 Type II scene
images, are then included to form the second super set. Incorporating this extra
super set is meant to further validate the effectiveness of the proposed concept of
content awareness. Using images with synthetic color interpolation also makes it
more feasible to expand the scope of content.
Fig. 2.12(a) and 2.12(b) show respectively the identification accuracies for the
two super sets. We explicitly separate Type I (I) and Type II (II) scenes to inspect
the effectiveness with respect to particular image content. We can see that blind
content selection always yields the lower accuracy, which suggests the importance
of content awareness. Blind selection can become even less accurate if the training
images are mixed in an unfavorable manner. For example, if only 1/5 of the images
in the first super set match the testing image, then the identification accuracy for
10 training images per camera drops from 84% to 74%. In the meantime, both
manual and automatic content selection using either RPP or CNP outperform blind
content selection with similar accuracy improvements. That is, our proposed auto-
matic content selection can effectively replace the tedious manual selection process
without sacrificing the identification accuracy. The results also suggest that the two
profiles RPP and CNP can both stand for the image content and have comparable
performances.
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blind content selection (I)
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of content selection schemes using (a) camera-generated
image data; (b) image data with synthetic color interpolation.
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Figure 2.13: Profile-based adaptive training scheme.
2.5 Profile-based Adaptive Training
In this section, we further exploit the notion of content awareness to improve
the accuracy of camera model identification. We propose a scheme, referred to as
profile-based adaptive training, whose schematic is shown in Fig. 2.13. The basic
principle of this scheme is to configure the camera model identifier according to
the profile of each testing image, so that the resulting identifier better matches the
characteristics of the testing image. We consider a special version of profile-based
adaptive training, which aims at selecting a given number of training images for
each camera model from the super set. The selected training images are then used
to train a camera model identifier implemented by a learning algorithm, such as the
SVM employed in this chapter. While the manual and automatic content selection
schemes discussed in the previous section can be viewed as non-adaptive training
with a fixed number of configurations, this scheme is adaptive to each testing image.
This scheme is considered for two main reasons. On one hand, in the forensic
circumstance where only a small number of testing images need to be identified,
it is feasible to optimize the camera model identifier for each testing image. Such
an optimization, i.e., choosing a given number of training images from the super
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set, leads to a learning process with lower overhead and a lightweight customized
identifier. In comparison, learning an identifier using overly many training images
from the super set of possibly heterogeneous content may exceed the capacity of
the learning algorithm or cause prohibitive time and memory complexities. On the
other hand, we expect that such adaptive training can outperform the non-adaptive
training strategies, and thus can serve as a better indicator of the achievable accuracy
due to content awareness.
2.5.1 Adaptive Training Image Selection via Profile Matching
Following our discussion in Section 2.3, we assume that the set of color inter-
polation coefficient estimates is a random vector whose distribution is a function
of both the camera model as well as the image content. Denote the camera model
by c and let the content be indexed by a profile p (which can be RPP or CNP
proposed in this chapter), then the distribution of the coefficient estimate vector
v can written as D(v|p, c). Under our setting, for each candidate camera model
c, we assume that we have a super set of training images {Ic1, Ic2, . . . , IcN}, from
which we can calculate the corresponding profiles {pc1,pc2, . . . ,pcN} and the coef-
ficient estimate vectors {vc1,vc2, . . . ,vcN}. When a testing image It with profile pt
and coefficient estimate vector vt is given, profile-based adaptive training aims at
selecting nc training images from each camera model c so that the resulting cam-
era model identifier matches the testing image content indexed by pt; that is, the
camera model identifier learns the distribution D(v|pt, c). Since the training image
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selection is carried out independently for each camera model, hereafter we omit the
camera model c for sake of notational convenience. We also write D(v|p) as D(p)
to highlight the mapping from a profile p to a distribution D(v|p).
First assume that Di , D(pi) is available for each pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . For a given
pt, profile-based adaptive training selects a subset of indices {s1, s2, . . . , sn} from 1
to N and uses {Ds1, . . . ,Dsn} to interpolate D(pt). To perform such interpolation,
one needs to assume an underlying structure for the mapping p → D(p) for all the
convex combinations of {psi}1≤i≤n, i.e., {
∑n
i=1 θipsi|θi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 θi = 1}. For ana-




i=1 θiD(psi) for all θi ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 θi = 1. D(pt) can then be optimally determined
by expressing pt using {ps1 , . . . ,psn} with minimal representation error. If the pro-
file representation error is measured in squared error sense, the subset selection task



























wi = 1, wi ≤ bi.
(2.2)
In (2.2), variables {bi} are used to specify indices that are selected, and {wi}
are weights assigned to selected indices for representing pt. The constraint wi ≤ bi
is to ensure that if bi = 0 (i.e., if index i is not selected), then wi = 0 as well.
The problem (2.2) is difficult to solve primarily due to the multiplicative form of
wibi in the objective function and the integer constraints on {bi}. To approach
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this problem, we adopt a two-step relaxation strategy. In the first step, we let the
weights {wi} be equally distributed among n selected indices, namely wi = 1/n if
and only if bn = 1. This makes wi a function of bi and can be removed from (2.2).
In the second step, we relax the constraint bi ∈ {0, 1} as 0 ≤ bi ≤ 1. After the


























which is a quadratic programming (QP) problem and can be solved in polynomial
time. Due to the relaxation, the obtained {bi} are not always 0 or 1, although they
are usually quite close to 0 or 1 as illustrated in Fig. 2.14. The indices with largest
bi are selected as {s1, . . . , sn}. Recall that we have assumed {Ds1 , . . . ,Dsn} are
available. In reality, we do not have these distributions, but only their realizations
{vs1, . . . ,vsn}. Nevertheless, we can treat these realizations as approximations of
the distributions, and feed them into the subsequent learning algorithm to learn the
desired distribution D(v|pt).
As the QP problem demands non-trivial complexity, an alternative is to simply
select {s1, . . . , sn} as those that correspond to the n profiles closest to pt, i.e., profiles
with minimum Euclidean distance to pt. The rationale for this alternative can be
understood as follows. When n = N , namely when all training images are selected,
it can be shown that the solution to (2.2) is bi = 1 and wi ∝ 1/‖pi − pt‖ for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N . The quantity 1/‖pi − pt‖ stands for the similarity between pi and
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training image index i
Figure 2.14: A typical solution to (2.3) where N = 100 and n = 10. Note that most
bis are either 0 or 1.
pt and indicates how important each training image is for representing the testing
image. Notice that we have implicitly adopted the similarity-based selection in the
non-adaptive schemes.
2.5.2 Comparisons and Discussions
We compare the identification accuracy of the proposed profile-based adaptive
training, including both the QP-based scheme and the similarity-based scheme, to
those of the content-aware content selection schemes for the two types of image con-
tent. Consistent observations are obtained for both types, and we show in Fig. 2.15
the accuracy results over testing images of the Type II scene. We can see that
the adaptive selection schemes outperform non-adaptive ones and manual selection,
suggesting that optimizing the camera model identifier by adapting to the content
of each testing image benefits the identification. Also, the results confirm again the
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efficacy of the proposed profiles for characterizing the image content. Between the
two adaptive schemes, the QP-based one exhibits a substantially higher accuracy,
suggesting that the QP solution more accurately approximates the image content
using the accessible training images.
Complexity Recall that an important reason for selecting a fixed number of train-
ing images via the profile-based adaptive training is to avoid the possible high time
and memory overhead when training using the entire super set. When the super
set size of each camera model is N , the QP-based scheme that solves (2.3) has
time complexity O(N3) and memory complexity O(N2), and the similarity-based
scheme has time complexity O(N) and memory complexity O(1). Repeating the
selection for a total of C camera models requires time complexity of O(CN3) and
O(CN), respectively. While learning a SVM using the entire super set also solves
a QP problem [6] and typically requires similar time and memory complexities as
solving (2.3), the number of variables in the SVM grows with the number of cam-
era models and thus can incur a substantially higher overhead. For example, if






O ((2N)3) = O(C2N3), which is higher than both the QP-based
and the similarity-based adaptive selection schemes.
Analogies to Other Classifier Adaptation Approaches The proposed profile-
based adaptive training builds a camera model identifier that adapts to the content
characteristics of each testing image to mitigate the mismatch between the training
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and testing data distribution. In the literature, such mismatch has also been dealt
under the general notion of classifier adaptation within different contexts, such as
domain adaptation [28] in machine learning and concept drift [72] in data mining.
Domain adaptation addresses issues such as covariate shift in shared distribution
support by reweighting training data samples where the weights are estimated from
a bunch of testing data to be classified, and concept drift is handled by maintaining
a proper time window that moves over the training data stream for learning the
concept and weighting the training data according to age or utility to the targeted
concept [36], or by adapting a learnt concept to new training data in an incremental
manner without repeated training over used data [78]. We plan to investigate in the
future if similar ideas can be incorporated into our profile-based adaptive training.
One possible route is to see if we can integrate our training data selection with in-
cremental learning so that a customized identifier can be built by directly adapting
an existing identifier to a small amount of training data selected from the super set.
2.6 Extension to Other Image Contents
In previous sections, we have assumed that images can be classified into Type
I and Type II scenes. In reality, however, such classification cannot be perfectly
definite and a certain
ambiguity always exists. In such cases, manual selection of training images may
become infeasible, and we resort to our automatic content selection schemes as a
possible remedy. In this section, we consider the setting where the same super set
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manual content selection
non−adaptive selection using RPP
non−adaptive selection using CNP
(b)
Figure 2.15: Comparison of adaptive and non-adaptive content selection schemes
(a) camera-generated image data; (b) image data with synthetic color interpolation.
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consisting of Type I and Type II training images is collected beforehand, and a
separate image set of possibly ambiguous content is used for testing. We conduct
two experiments. The first experiment uses composite content with Type I and
Type II equally mixed. The second experiment uses another three extra image sets
of specialized content.
2.6.1 Composite Content
First, we create a synthetic image set by equally mixing Type I and Type
II. More specifically, the left half of each synthetic image is copied from a Type I
image, and the right half is from a Type II image. The color interpolation procedure
in Section 2.4.2 is carried out to generate eight color interpolated versions of the
synthetic image. Such setting mimics the case when a testing image is a composition
of Type I and Type II scenes, which can be observed in reality. Under this setting, all
the testing images cannot be easily categorized, and therefore it becomes infeasible
to manually select the training images. As such, we can only compare the proposed
adaptive scheme with blind selection.
As shown in Fig. 2.16, both the similarity-based and the QP-based selection
schemes outperform blind selection for images with composite content, and the QP-
based scheme is superior to the similarity-based one except when a larger number
(> 20) of training images from each camera are used where the two schemes both
lead to high (> 97%) identification accuracies. We can see that the identification
improvement due to adaptive training and more accurate approximation of testing
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QP−based adaptive selection using CNP
similarity−based adaptive selection using CNP
QP−based adaptive selection using RPP
similarity−based adaptive selection using RPP
blind content selection
Figure 2.16: Comparison of blind and adaptive content selection schemes for images
with composite content.
image content is particularly prominent when the number of training images is
smaller. The achievable accuracy for the composite image content is higher than
the case of Type II images and slightly lower than the case of Type I images. This
is expected since half of each testing image is from Type I. As the image block
size is reasonably large (512 × 512 pixels here), there are enough linear equations
available for coefficient estimation, and thus the within-camera scatter is small and
the identification accuracy is high.
2.6.2 Other Image Contents
We also use three extra sets of synthetic images retrieved on Google Images
using keywords “lion”, “sea”, and “texture”, respectively. Examples of these three
sets are shown in Fig. 2.17. A closer inspection suggests that the collected “lion”
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.17: Examples of three image categories retrieved from Google Images: (a)
lion; (b) sea; (c) texture.
images tend to have textures such as dense hair that shares certain similarity with
our Type I images. In comparison, “sea” images are usually smoother and lack rich
variations, and “texture” images tend to have more regular variations.
Fig. 2.18 compares blind and adaptive content selection schemes upon the
three types of testing images. Except for one case (lion images, blind content selec-
tion versus similarity-based adaptive selection using RPP), both adaptive selection
schemes outperform blind selection. Also, the QP-based selection scheme leads to
more accurate identification than the similarity-based selection scheme, except for
the case upon sea images using the CNP profile where the two schemes yield compa-
rable accuracies. We can also notice that CNP seems to be a better representation
for these image content categories. Our results here confirm again that the proposed
adaptive schemes along with the two profiles can substantially improve the accuracy
of camera model identification even for unseen image categories.
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Figure 2.18: Comparison of blind and adaptive content selection schemes for (a)
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2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we first present a study of camera model identification using
the refined color interpolation coefficient features. Sixteen cell-phone cameras that
cover today’s consumer market are used for performance assessment. A detailed
statistical analysis of the estimated coefficients with respect to different image con-
tent shows a substantial content dependency and its impacts on the identification
performance. As our study suggests, the image content determines the achievable
identification performance, and the identification performance can be penalized due
to mismatch between the content of training and testing images. Such an under-
standing not only serves as a rule of thumb for manually selecting training images
that provide sufficient coefficient variations as well as match the testing images,
but also leads to automatic training image selection schemes based on our proposed
region partitioning profile (RPP) and condition number profile (CNP) that can be
easily calculated upon each individual image.
We further propose profile-based adaptive training that can select the optimal
training images tailored to the content characteristics of each given testing image.
This ensures a lightweight construction of accurate identifiers without incorporating
unnecessarily many training images. The selection can be formulated as an profile
matching optimization problem that can be relaxed to a quadratic programming
(QP) problem and can be solved in polynomial time. Further simplification leads
to the selection scheme using the inverse Euclidean distance between two profiles as
an indicator for each training image’s representation power. As shown in our exten-
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sive experiments using both camera-generated and synthetic images, our proposed
schemes avoids the tedious manual selection process and significantly improves the
identification performance. In particular, when images with content that cannot
be easily categorized are tested, our automatic schemes can effectively select the
training images systematically and quantitatively.
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CHAPTER 3
Camera Model Identification against Anti-Forensics
3.1 Chapter Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth of digital imaging technology. The
number of pixels on a camera has increased by an order of magnitude in the past
decade, and the optical components as well as the signal processing algorithms have
also been advanced significantly. Many compact cameras are now equipped with
lenses that used to be exclusive for high-end single lens reflex (SLR) cameras, and
intelligent in-camera processing modules such as auto focus and color temperature
adjustment have become sufficiently reliable to replace manual operations. Most
recently, computational photography has begun to impact on how digital image are
formed, and new imaging devices such as the light-field camera [51] have emerged
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in the consumer market as viable options.
As various imaging technologies across different generations are available, new
forensic questions about digital images have also been raised and are receiving grow-
ing attention. This includes but not limited to: 1) What kind of imaging devices,
such as digital cameras, scanners, computer graphics, among others, have been used
to create a digital image? 2) If the image is created by, for example, a digital cam-
era, then is it taken by a point and shoot camera, a SLR camera, or a cellphone
camera? Further, what is the mostly likely make and model of the source camera?
3) As increasingly more digital cameras now can be equipped with interchangeable
lenses, what lens has been used as an image is taken?
To answer these questions, a primary research direction in the literature of digi-
tal image forensics has focused on the identification of imaging technologies of digital
images. One class of techniques addresses the identification of the color interpolation
algorithm that a digital camera has used to create an image [5, 10, 57, 67]. Another
class studies the classification of source scanners based on noise features [26, 33].
It was investigated in [53] how to differentiate photographic images and computer
graphics using physics-motivated properties, and further in [47] how to separate
images produced by cameras, scanners, and graphics based on color interpolation
and noise statistics features. Recently, more research has been devoted to identi-
fying particular imaging components or imaging characteristics. For example, the
identification of SLR lenses was considered in [79], the classification of cellphone
cameras was investigated in [11,17], and the recognition of digital images formed by
compressive sensing was discussed in [13].
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However, similar to many other tasks regarding data trustworthiness, adver-
saries who have incentives to perform anti-forensic operations to counter forensic
analysis always exist [35, 65]. For example, consider the scenario of technology in-
fringement where a company infringes another company’s imaging technology via
reverse engineering or industrial espionages. The pirating company has incentives to
counteract the identification of color interpolation so that it can use the technology
without being caught. It may be of further interest to the pirating company if it
can mislead the identification toward a wrong direction that suggests a distinctly
different technology. In the scenario of crime scene investigation [48], being aware
that information about the source device and the potential owner can be inferred
from the imaging technology employed [10, 17, 67], a technology-savvy criminal can
conceal the origin of a digital image by circumventing the identification.
These scenarios prompt a strong need for understanding the resilience of to-
day’s techniques for identifying digital imaging technologies against anti-forensics.
Toward this goal, we have to first explore applicable anti-forensic techniques and
evaluate the identification performance against these anti-forensic operations. In
principle, one can alter the image to weaken the evidence that may reveal the un-
derlying imaging technology. There exists an inherent trade-off between the strength
of the trace concealment and the quality of the resulting image: if the strength is too
weak, the identification is likely to remain effective, but if the strength is too strong,
the image may suffer from serious distortions. Both situations are unfavorable to the
adversary. Different anti-forensic operations may exhibit unequal trade-offs between
image quality and identification manipulations; therefore, in order to understand the
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comprehensive impacts of anti-forensics, it is necessary to examine different options
for anti-forensics and compare their trade-offs.
Color interpolation is a commonly used step among various imaging processes
involved in today’s digital cameras and has a crucial impact on the quality of out-
put images [40]. Different camera manufacturers compete with customized color
interpolation modules to enhance the image quality, and it has been shown that
the underlying color interpolation method leaves detectable traces in output im-
ages that can be leveraged to infer source information such as the camera make
and model [10, 17, 67]. In view of the importance of color interpolation identifi-
cation, we will study in this chapter its resilience against anti-forensic operations,
although our methodology is generic in nature and can be easily extended to ex-
amine other imaging technologies. To the best of our knowledge, the most relevant
work to this chapter is by Kirchner and Böhme in [34], whereby a method was
presented to resynthesize a linear color interpolation relation in digital images and
minimizes the image quality distortion. Compared to the work in [34], we study
counter-identification techniques of lower complexities that can readily applied to a
large class of interpolation algorithms that cannot be simply modeled as linear. Our
results provide new insights into the resilience of color interpolation identification
and reveal inherent vulnerabilities of today’s technique. The forensic analyst, once
aware of such vulnerabilities, can update the identification technique, which calls
for an update on the adversary’s side as well. We also formulate such an interplay
using a game-theoretic approach and discuss the optimal strategies accessible to a
forensic analyst and an adversary.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews color
interpolation and its identification based on [67]. Section 3.3 proposes a generic
methodology of parameter perturbation for circumventing the identification of a
given color interpolation algorithm. Section 3.4 investigates how to mislead the
identification toward an incorrect decision. Section 3.5 discusses extensions of the
anti-forensic techniques and insights into our study. Section 3.6 summarizes this
chapter.
3.2 Design and Evaluation of a Color Interpolation Identification
System
In this section, we describe in detail our design and evaluation of a color
interpolation identification system, which will be used in subsequent sections for
our anti-forensic study.
3.2.1 Mechanism Formulation of Color Interpolation Identification
The fundamental principles and techniques of color interpolation identification
as a core element in camera model identification has been explained in details in
Chapter 2. We review here some key setups for the sake of self-consistency. In this
chapter, we perform the identification of color interpolation based on the scheme
proposed in [67]. This scheme is one of the earliest works that incorporates the
concept of direction-adaptive interpolation and has been shown to have a promising
identification performance. We improve upon the scheme with refined directional
56
classification for higher identification accuracy. Specifically, define Ix,y as the sensor





























Hx,y = |Ix,y−2 + Ix,y+2 − Ix,y|,
Vx,y = |Ix−2,y + Ix+2,y − Ix,y|,
Dx,y = |Ix−2,y−2 + Ix+2,y+2 − Ix,y|,
Ax,y = |Ix−2,y+2 + Ix+2,y−2 − Ix,y|.
Each pixel at location (x, y) is classified into one of five directional regions
according to its gradient profile using two preset thresholds T1 and T2. The adopted
color interpolation identification scheme assumes that pixels belonging to the same
directional region are interpolated by a fixed linear interpolation kernel, whose coef-
ficients can be estimated using the least-squares method. The overall color interpo-
lation algorithm can then be represented by a coefficient vector θ that concatenates
all the coefficients associated with each directional region in each color channel.
A general system of identification in our framework learns and matches θ re-
spectively in a training phase and a testing phase. In the training phase, the forensic
analyst learns from some training data the coefficient vector θ and its possible vari-
ations due to the pre-processing and post-process modules. In the testing phase,
the forensic analyst matches given testing data against the learnt θ to determine if
they are consistent. Recently, identification of digital devices has been studied more
systematically in the context of component forensics [70], where different scenar-
ios can be considered depending on the accessibility to the device under question.
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Specifically, in the scenario of intrusive forensics, the analyst has full access to the
device, and can arbitrarily break the device apart to inspect each component inside
the device. In the scenario of semi non-intrusive forensics, the analyst still has
access to the device but cannot break it apart. To build forensic evidence about
the components algorithms and parameters, the analyst can only design appropri-
ate inputs to the device and examine the relation between the designed inputs and
the corresponding outputs. In the scenario of completely non-intrusive forensics,
the analyst has no access to the device, and can only use some provided sample
device outputs to estimate the component properties. It is clear that these three
different scenarios correspond to different levels of forensic capabilities. While the
intrusive forensics appears to be very powerful, it may not be always available in
reality. Techniques for semi and completely non-intrusive forensics thus may have
higher practical values and are the two scenarios of interest in this chapter.
Considering the problem of counter identification based on component foren-
sics, recall for example the infringement detection task described in Section 6.1.
Since the owner of the color interpolation technology can select training data to
learn the coefficient vector θ, one can assumes that the training phase is (at least)
semi non-intrusive. The testing phase is semi non-intrusive if the device made by
the pirate company is also accessible to the actual technology owner, and completely
non-intrusive if only sample images from the device are available. Without loss of
generalizability, we focus in this chapter the combination of a semi non-intrusive
training phase and a complete non-intrusive testing phase, and our methodology
can be extended to other combinations in a similar fashion. In both phases, an
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estimate for θ is obtained from given images. A good number of images are used
in the training phase to ensure that the variability due to S ′ is fully captured, and
only a limited number of sample images are available in the testing phase. For
the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the processing modules posterior to the
color interpolation module is either pre-compensated (for example, if it is known
and reversible) or ignorable (if it only introduces minor effects or its effects can be
absorbed into color interpolation). We can then formulate the relation between the
input scene and output image in terms of the coefficient vector θ and estimate the
distribution of θ using the training data. Finally, the identification system exam-
ines the consistency between θ estimated during the training and testing phases,
and reports an identification confidence C(It) of each testing image It. More details
about these individual steps will be discussed in the following section.
3.2.2 Experiment Setup and Performance Metrics
We describe here our experiment setup and performance metrics for carrying
out and evaluating anti-forensic schemes. Our goals here are to sample representa-
tive color interpolation algorithms used in our study, and to establish a testbed on
which we can evaluate forensic and anti-forensic capabilities in terms of identification
accuracy and the resulting image quality.
Color Interpolation Algorithms: Color interpolation has been an active re-
search area in image processing. Detailed surveys and comparisons of color inter-
polation techniques can be found in [2, 40]. The algorithms in the literature range
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from non-adaptive ones with low complexity such as bilinear or bicubic interpola-
tion to highly adaptive and complex ones that can better capture the underlying
image structure and recover the lost color information. We include eight color in-
terpolation algorithms in this chapter. The first six have been well known in the
literature for more than one decade, including bilinear, bicubic, smooth hue, median
filter based, gradient based, and an adaptive color plane algorithm [2]. In recent
years, significant progress has been made to improve the reconstruction quality of
color interpolation. To reflect the state of the art, we also include a recent algorithm
based on local polynomial approximation (LPA) and intersection of confidence in-
tervals (ICI) [55], which performs well in a comparative survey [40], and a latest
algorithm that combines local directional interpolation (LDI) and nonlocal adaptive
thresholding (NAT) [80].
We construct a dataset composed of images interpolated by the above eight
algorithms. Specifically, we first take 75 high-resolution images with a variety of
content by a high-end standalone camera. From each image, we extract the central
portion of 1024 × 1024 pixels, which is prefiltered and down-sampled to 512 × 512
pixels in order to attenuate the traces of color interpolation and post-processing
left by the camera. The resulting 512 × 512 “full-color” image is then sampled
according to a given CFA pattern, and interpolated using each of the eight different
interpolation algorithms to simulate in-camera processing.
Performance Metrics: As discussed in Section 6.1, image quality plays an im-
portant role in evaluating the performance of anti-forensic operations. We adopt
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in this chapter the full-reference methodology [75] for image quality assessment
whereby the quality of a color interpolated image is assessed with respect to a ref-
erence image. The 512× 512 full-color image discussed above is used for reference,
which is justified in the same way as in [40] and we find that such reference images
are visually pleasant. There are a handful of full-reference image quality metrics in
the literature. The Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is probably the most well-
known one. While it is still widely used, previous research has shown that PSNR
may not always reflect the true signal fidelity [75]. The quality metric called Struc-
tural Similarity (SSIM) index [75] incorporates the similarity in image structure to
capture the subjective quality perceived by human beings. One notable artifact in
color interpolation is called zipper effect, which occurs if an interpolation algorithm
fails to interpolate pixels along directional edges, as illustrated in Fig. 3.1(a). The
extent of zipper effect can be quantified by the quality metric called zipper effect
ratio [8,80] , which measures the increase in spatial color discontinuity due to color
interpolation. In order to provide a comprehensive assessment of image quality, it is
beneficial to examine more than one quality metric. Fig. 3.1(b) compares the PSNR
and the zipper effect ratio of each algorithm, averaging over all testing images. In
terms of both metrics, algorithms with higher indices perform better. These algo-
rithms are more sophisticated and represent the advancement of color interpolation
technology.
Identification System: We construct a color interpolation identification sys-
tem that uses the color interpolation coefficients as features. We use the 75 images
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Figure 3.1: (a) An example of zipper effect (best viewed on a screen); (b) PSNR and
zipper effect ratio averaged over 50 images associated with different interpolation
algorithms: (1) bilinear, (2) bicubic, (3) smooth hue, (4) median filter based, (5)
gradient based, (6) adaptive color plane, (7) LPA-ICI, and (8) LDI-NAT.
described above and their interpolated versions created by each of the eight interpo-
lation algorithms. The total number of interpolated images is therefore 75×8 = 600.
Totally 400 of these images are used for training an 8-class probabilistic Support
Vector Machine (pSVM) classifier [67] with parameters selected by cross valida-
tion, and the remaining 200 images are used for testing. The identification system
takes an image as input, and outputs the likelihood of each of the eight algorithms.
Maximum-likelihood classification yields an overall accuracy of 96.3%, suggesting
the accuracy of color interpolation identification. The maximum likelihood is then
adopted as the identification confidence of the classification result.
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3.3 Circumventing Color Interpolation Identification via Parameter
Perturbation
Our first anti-forensic goal is to circumvent the identification of a specific
color interpolation algorithm when it is used for interpolation. We refer to such an
algorithm as a targeted interpolation algorithm. We model a color interpolation algo-
rithm as a combination of an architecture part that entails the algorithmic flow and
the parameter part that consists of configurable settings. To circumvent the identi-
fication, perturbation can be introduced into a parameter part to alter the overall
color interpolation algorithm, so that estimated color interpolation coefficients are
changed and cannot be recognized by the identification system. As pointed out in
Section 6.1, there is a trade-off between the resulting image quality and the manip-
ulation power of identification results. We will examine whether it is possible to
reach a good balance between these two factors by wisely selecting the parameters
for perturbation.
3.3.1 Perturbing Gradient-based Interpolation
We consider the 5th color interpolation algorithm reviewed in Section 3.2.2 as
a targeted interpolation algorithm. This algorithm is based on a gradient-based par-
titioning of image pixels [2], and its architecture is shown in Fig. 3.2. We consider
several options of parameter perturbation that are applicable to this algorithm.
First, since the algorithm utilizes bilinear filtering in interpolating the difference
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart of Gradient-based color interpolation.
efficients of bilinear filtering. Second, the targeted interpolation algorithm performs
pixel averaging in the green channel according to the gradient direction (horizontal,
vertical, and non-directional). A second option is hence to perturb the pixel averag-
ing kernels in each direction. Finally, this algorithm takes two parameters, denoted
as θ1 and θ2, to determine if a pixel falls on a horizontal edge, a vertical edge, or
in a non-directional region, so a third option is to perturb the decision boundaries
of individual directions. In the summary of these options below, the noise standard
deviations are selected so that the trade-offs of different options can be compared
more easily:
Option 1: Add Gaussian noise to the bilinear interpolation coefficient matrix.
Noise standard deviation ∈ {0.16, 0.24, 0.3}. Note that the perturbation has to
satisfy constraints on the coefficients’ mutual relations. In particular, two coefficients
at opposite horizontal/vertical positions, and four coefficients at opposite diagonal
positions, must have a fixed sum of 1.
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Option 2: Add Gaussian noise to the direction-wise averaging coefficients. Noise
standard deviation ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}. Similar to Option 1, a fixed sum constraint
must be imposed on the coefficients.
Option 3: Add Gaussian noise to the gradient decision threshold values θ1 and θ2.
Noise standard deviation ∈ {0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. θ1 and θ2 must satisfy θ1 + θ2 > 0 so
that pixels are assigned into non-overlapping gradient directions.
For comparison, we consider alternative options that do not involve parameter
perturbation. For example, in the scenario of technology infringement, if the risk
of being caught is high, one option that a pirating company has is to abandon the
targeted interpolation algorithm and adopt another algorithm instead. Other alter-
native options include applying post-processing operations such as compression and
filtering after color interpolation in order to conceal the trace of color interpolation.
These three more options are summarized below:
Option 4 (i): Replace the gradient-based targeted interpolation algorithm, which is
the 5th among those compared in Section 3.2.2, by another interpolation algorithm
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8}.
Option 5: JPEG compression after interpolation. Quality factor (QF) ∈ {95, 75}.
Option 6 (1): 3× 3 median filtering after interpolation; (2): 3× 3 average filtering
after interpolation.
Comparison of Options: Table 3.1 shows the comparison of various options
in terms of image quality and identification confidence. We present multiple image
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Table 3.1: Results of countering color interpolation identification for a gradient-
based interpolation algorithm. PSNR is measured in dB. “Zipper” stands for the
zipper effect ratio; “Conf” stands for the identification confidence.
Uncompressed JPEG compressed with QF=95
PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf
Option 1 (1) 38.83 0.96 0.02 0.81 39.50 0.96 0.02 0.81
(2) 38.33 0.96 0.03 0.63 38.99 0.96 0.03 0.70
(3) 37.89 0.95 0.03 0.46 37.16 0.94 0.04 0.66
Option 2 (1) 39.01 0.96 0.02 0.90 39.38 0.96 0.02 0.80
(2) 37.45 0.95 0.03 0.80 37.90 0.96 0.04 0.43
(3) 35.46 0.94 0.05 0.50 36.03 0.94 0.06 0.10
Option 3 (1) 39.02 0.96 0.02 0.53 39.02 0.96 0.03 0.49
(2) 38.66 0.96 0.03 0.30 38.80 0.96 0.03 0.28
(3) 38.41 0.96 0.03 0.18 38.42 0.96 0.04 0.16
Option 4 (1) 35.92 0.94 0.03 0.01 37.33 0.95 0.02 0.03
(2) 36.49 0.95 0.03 0.01 38.04 0.96 0.02 0.01
(3) 37.44 0.96 0.04 0.03 38.08 0.96 0.05 0.04
(4) 38.06 0.94 0.03 0.01 38.23 0.94 0.05 0.01
(6) 39.91 0.96 0.01 0.01 40.20 0.96 0.02 0.02
(7) 39.93 0.95 0.01 0.01 40.03 0.96 0.02 0.01
(8) 40.32 0.96 0.01 0.01 40.54 0.97 0.04 0.01
Option 5 (1) 37.24 0.93 0.02 0.64 38.55 0.95 0.03 0.45
(2) 35.41 0.91 0.03 0.08 37.02 0.94 0.04 0.11
Option 6 (1) 35.95 0.93 0.01 0.42 36.40 0.94 0.02 0.39
(2) 34.70 0.92 0.02 0.14 34.98 0.92 0.02 0.04
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Figure 3.3: Visualization of Table 3.1: (a) PSNR versus identification confidence; (b)
SSIM versus identification confidence. See Section 3.3.1 for the detailed description.
quality metrics to provide a more comprehensive quality assessment. This table
consists of two parts. The left part of columns is the case when there is no post-
processing following color interpolation. The right part of columns includes JPEG
compression as post-processing. Note that in the right part, the reference image is
also compressed. To facilitate the comparison, we also show the relation between 1)
PSNR and identification confidence, and 2) SSIM and identification confidence, for
varying noise strengths that correspond to the left part of columns.
From Table 3.1 as well as Fig. 3.3, we can first see that parameter perturbation
reduces the identification confidence at different costs in terms of image quality.
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(a) Without perturbation (b) Option 1
(c) Option 2 (d) Option 3
(e) Without perturbation (f) Option 1
(g) Option 2 (h) Option 3
Figure 3.4: Perceptual comparison of images generated by the original interpolation
algorithm and Perturbation Options 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3.1 (best viewed on a
screen).
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Option 2 causes image quality degradation, but the identification confidence is kept
relatively high. Note that we have imposed coefficient constraints on Option 1
and 2 to ensure that the perturbed coefficient matrices are still valid; otherwise
the unconstrained perturbation would have led to much worse trade-offs between
image quality and confidence reduction than the reported values. Compared to
Option 1 to 2, Option 3 achieves highest image quality and lowest identification
confidence. In particular, Option 3 reduces the identification confidence by 40%
with little reduction in image quality (for example, PSNR decreases from 38.66dB to
38.41dB and there is nearly no reduction in other quality metrics). The three options
can also be perceptually compared. For the same level of remaining identification
confidence (≈ 0.1), we show in Fig. 3.4 two typical images that are generated by the
original interpolation algorithm and by each option. It can be easily noticed that in
order to effectively reduce the identification confidence, Options 1 and 2 create more
artifacts along edges than Option 3, which suggests again that Option 3 achieves a
better trade-off between image quality and confidence reduction from an adversary’s
point of view.
We also compare Option 3 with options that do not involve parameter per-
turbation. If we replace the gradient-based targeted interpolation algorithm by any
other interpolation algorithm as in Option 4, the identification confidence drops
to near zero. This is expected since the 8-class pSVM is tailored to differentiate
these algorithms. However, for Options 4 (1) to (4) that employ more rudimen-
tary interpolation algorithms, the image quality is inferior to what Option 3 yields,
which would be unacceptable as image quality is a crucial criterion in many imag-
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ing applications. Option 4 (6) to (8), which replace the gradient-based targeted
interpolation algorithm by more sophisticated algorithms, outperform Option 3 in
both image quality and identification confidence. This implies that, if a pirating
company has more advanced technology, it should utilize such technology and there
is no incentive to infringe other companies’ technology.
Option 5 and 6 apply post-processing after color interpolation. These op-
tions reduce the identification confidence considerably, but none of them produce
images with quality comparable to Option 3. Overall, Option 3 that perturbs de-
cision threshold values is simple yet effective for circumventing color interpolation
identification with minimal reduction in image quality.
3.3.2 Perturbing Other Interpolation Algorithms
The proposed parameter perturbation methodology is readily applicable to
other color interpolation algorithms. In particular, since a majority of interpola-
tion algorithms are direction-adaptive based on local gradients, the options that
perturb gradient-related parameters can also be employed. Here we give two more
examples in order to further examine the effectiveness of the proposed parameter
perturbation technique. We first consider the adaptive color plane algorithm (6th in
our list of interpolation algorithms), also known as Hamilton-Adams algorithm [3].
Different from the gradient-based color interpolation algorithm that only involves
intra-channel interpolation (i.e., pixels are only interpolated using raw pixels of the
same color), the adaptive color plane algorithm also performs inter-channel interpo-
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lation (i.e., pixels can be interpolated using raw pixels of different colors). Similar
to perturbing the gradient-based algorithm, there are a few options that can be
considered. Option 1 and 2 perturb the intra-channel and inter-channel pixel aver-
aging kernels, respectively. Option 3 perturbs the gradient decision threshold values
as in the gradient-based interpolation algorithm. The same Options 4 to 6 as in
the gradient-based interpolation algorithm are also included for comparison. The
results shown in Table 3.2 are consistent with what have been observed in Table 3.1,
and we can see that Option 3 that perturbs the gradient decision boundaries is still
the most effective choice for circumventing identification while preserving the image
quality.
We have also applied parameter perturbation to the LDI-NAT algorithm (our
8th algorithm), which is considered as the state-of-the-art progress in color inter-
polation [80]. The LDI-NAT algorithm first conducts directional interpolation by
assigning relative weights to pixel value estimates along different directions (north,
south, east, west), wherein the weights are inversely proportional to local gradi-
ent values along respective directions. Then the interpolation results are further
enhanced using a nonlocal patch estimation method based on dictionary learning.
Compared to the gradient-based or the adaptive color plane algorithm, directional
interpolation in the LDI-NAT algorithm does not employ hard partitioning of pixel
directions. Therefore, instead of perturbing decision boundaries which are not de-
fined in the LDI-NAT algorithm, we can perturb the weights assigned to respective
directions. We consider here for illustration an extreme case of taking as weights
the gradient values rather than their reciprocals as in the original LDI-NAT. We
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Table 3.2: Results of countering color interpolation identification for the adaptive
color plane interpolation algorithm. PSNR is measured in dB. “Zipper” stands for
the zipper effect ratio; “Conf” stands for the identification confidence.
Uncompressed JPEG compressed with QF=95
PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf
Option 1 (1) 38.04 0.94 0.03 0.94 38.27 0.95 0.04 0.86
(2) 33.12 0.87 0.14 0.90 33.53 0.88 0.16 0.70
(3) 29.64 0.80 0.25 0.75 30.22 0.80 0.27 0.43
Option 2 (1) 38.04 0.94 0.04 0.84 39.25 0.95 0.03 0.69
(2) 37.08 0.93 0.06 0.81 38.85 0.95 0.04 0.66
(3) 36.12 0.92 0.09 0.76 36.66 0.93 0.08 0.45
Option 3 (1) 39.70 0.96 0.01 0.44 39.83 0.96 0.02 0.39
(2) 39.56 0.96 0.01 0.33 39.71 0.96 0.02 0.29
(3) 39.38 0.96 0.01 0.20 39.55 0.96 0.02 0.18
Option 4 (1) 35.92 0.94 0.03 0.01 37.33 0.95 0.02 0.03
(2) 36.49 0.95 0.03 0.01 38.04 0.96 0.02 0.01
(3) 37.44 0.96 0.04 0.03 38.08 0.96 0.05 0.04
(4) 38.06 0.94 0.03 0.01 38.23 0.94 0.05 0.01
(5) 39.24 0.96 0.02 0.01 39.61 0.96 0.02 0.02
(7) 39.93 0.95 0.01 0.01 40.03 0.96 0.02 0.01
(8) 40.32 0.96 0.01 0.01 40.54 0.97 0.04 0.01
Option 5 (1) 37.24 0.93 0.02 0.64 38.55 0.95 0.03 0.45
(2) 35.41 0.91 0.03 0.08 37.02 0.94 0.04 0.11
Option 6 (1) 35.84 0.93 0.01 0.39 36.44 0.94 0.01 0.42
(2) 34.62 0.92 0.02 0.08 35.07 0.93 0.02 0.02
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Table 3.3: Results of countering color interpolation identification for the LDI-NAT
algorithm. PSNR is measured in dB. “Zipper” stands for the zipper effect ratio;
“Conf” stands for the identification confidence.
Uncompressed JPEG compressed with QF=95
PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf PSNR SSIM Zipper Conf
Option A 38.50 0.95 0.02 0.50 38.85 0.96 0.03 0.48
Option 5 (1) 37.89 0.94 0.01 0.59 40.37 0.97 0.01 0.58
(2) 35.60 0.91 0.03 0.63 37.17 0.94 0.03 0.52
Option 6 (1) 35.94 0.93 0.01 0.50 36.53 0.94 0.01 0.31
(2) 34.54 0.91 0.02 0.31 34.95 0.93 0.02 0.18
compare this option (denoted by Option A) to JPEG compression (Option 5) and
filtering (Option 6) in Table 3.3; note that the same Option 5 and 6 have also been
applied to the gradient-based and the adaptive color plane algorithms. We can see
that perturbing the gradient-based weights achieves a better trade-off (between im-
age quality and manipulation of identification confidence) than JPEG compression.
On the other hand, as it results in a slightly higher identification confidence than
filtering, the image quality is substantially higher, too. It can also be observed that,
as directional interpolation is only part of LDI-NAT, perturbing its parameters may
cause a smaller reduction in the identification confidence.
3.4 Misleading Color Interpolation Identification via Algorithm Mix-
ing
So far, we have investigated ways to prevent the color-interpolation-based iden-
tification system from identifying a specific interpolation algorithm. We now study
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how to further mislead the identification system toward a wrong direction, namely,
keeping the resulting image visually similar to the original version interpolated by
a specific algorithm (referred to as ALG1), while making the identification system
believe that the image is interpolated by a different algorithm (referred to as ALG2).
This can be considered as a generalized scenario of the one described in Kirchner
and Böhme’s work [34], wherein ALG2 is the bilinear interpolation. For our study
here, the similarity between two images is measured in terms of PSNR, but other
metrics such as the SSIM can also be used for similarity measurement.
We examine the fusion of ALG1 and ALG2 per a given modification ratio α,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Specifically, we realize the fusion by mixing pixels generated by ALG1
and ALG2. There are multiple ways to carry out the mixing. One option is to mix
pixels interpolated by ALG1 and ALG2 via linear averaging with weights (1 − α)
and α, respectively. This is is also known as alpha blending in the literature of image
editing. Alternatively, one can randomly select pixels from ALG1 and ALG2 with
ratios (1−α) and α, respectively, which can be seen as non-linear mixing. We exam-
ine linear and random mixing methods for the case ALG1=5 and ALG2 ∈ {1, 3, 4}
(that is, ALG1 is the 5th algorithm and ALG2 are the 1st, 3rd, and 4th algorithms
from Section 3.2.2), while similar results can be observed for other combinations of
ALG1 and ALG2 as well. As shown in Fig. 3.5, for both mixing methods, when
the modification ratio α increases, the resulting image becomes less similar to the
original version by ALG1, the identification confidence of ALG1 decreases, and the
identification confidence of ALG2 increases. The exact identification manipulation
power at the cost of visual similarity reduction depends on the choice of ALG2. For
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example, when the modification ratio is 0.5, the choice of ALG2=4 (i.e., the median
filter based algorithm) is better at lowering the identification confidence of ALG1
and raising the confidence of ALG2.
On the other hand, these two mixing methods also differ in their trade-offs
between visual similarity reduction and identification manipulation. For the illus-
trative case of ALG1=5 and ALG2=3, Fig. 3.6 shows the relation between the visual
similarity to ALG1 and the identification confidence of ALG2. For a given mod-
ification ratio α, though these two mixing methods lead to similar identification
confidences of ALG2, linear mixing yields a higher PSNR, meaning that the output
of linear mixing remains more similar to the output of ALG1.
We also find that algorithm mixing can be employed as an option for circum-
venting the identification of a specific color interpolation algorithm (namely, the
task in Section 3.3). For illustration, we perform algorithm mixing by choosing the
gradient-based algorithm as ALG1 and the median filter based algorithm (the 4th
in Section 3.2.2) as ALG2. Fig. 3.7 shows the resulting image quality and identifi-
cation confidence of the targeted interpolation algorithm. Note that if linear mixing
is used, the PSNR does not decrease but actually increases when 0 < α < 0.75.
A similar observation has also been reported in [40], and this can be potentially
attributed to the independence of interpolation errors between different color in-
terpolation algorithms. For the selected ALG1 and ALG2, both mixing methods
achieve better balances between the image quality and the identification confidence
as compared to the options considered in Section 3.3.1. For example, for a PSNR
value of 38.41dB (the 3rd row associated with Option 3 in Table 3.1), the identi-
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Figure 3.5: Algorithm mixing for misleading identification. Left column ((a)-(c)):
linear mixing; right column ((d)-(f)): random mixing. (a) and (d): average PSNR
with respect to ALG1; (b) and (e): identification confidence of ALG1; (c) and (f):
identification confidence of ALG2.
fication confidence yielded by Option 3 is 0.18, but the two mixing methods lead
to even lower confidences of 0.09 and 0.01, respectively. Fig. 3.8 shows the average
image quality gain in terms of PSNR due to linear mixing. We further examine the
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Figure 3.6: PSNR w.r.t. ALG1 versus identification confidence of ALG2. ALG1=5,
ALG2=3.
extent of image quality improvement due to linear mixing. Specifically, for each pair
of interpolation algorithms, the image quality gain is defined as the non-negative
PSNR increase when the two algorithms are linearly mixed with an optimal modifi-
cation ratio, and the average gain with respect to a given algorithm is obtained by
averaging over all pairs that include the given algorithm. As we can see in Fig. 3.8,
the median filter based algorithm yields the largest gain (near 0.5dB), suggesting
that linearly mixing a targeted algorithm with the median filter based algorithm
is a promising option for circumventing identification while preserving (and poten-
tially increasing) the image quality. As a remark, it should be noted that algorithm
mixing, especially linear mixing, may require more processing and storage power in
the camera since multiple color interpolation algorithms may need to be performed
at each pixel location.
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Figure 3.7: Algorithm mixing for circumventing the identification of the gradient-
based interpolation algorithm.






















Figure 3.8: Average image quality gain in PSNR due to linear mixing.
3.5 Extensions and Further Discussions
In this section, we provide additional discussions of the proposed anti-forensic
techniques. First, we complement the randomized parameter perturbation by formu-
lating and solving an optimization problem that incorporates image quality and iden-
tification confidence. We also compare this chapter and a relevant prior work [34].
We then look into the inherent issues and its implications of the state-of-the-art
identification system. Finally, we study possible strategies of forensic analysts and
78
adversaries in view of these issues, and characterize their interplay using game-
theoretic techniques.
3.5.1 Optimization Problem Formulation of Parameter Perturbation
As an illustrative example, we have applied in Section 3.3 randomized param-
eter perturbation to conceal the gradient-based color interpolation algorithm, and
the performances in terms of the image quality and the identification confidence,
are measured by averaging over all the test images. When some images are used for
identification, as shown in Fig. 3.9(a), the identification confidence may remain high
after the randomized perturbation. In order to ensure identification circumvention
for individual images, note that the identification is usually performed by an au-
tomated detector, and thus it is sufficient and necessary to make the identification
confidence fall below a threshold that has been set in the automated detector. To-




Q(Ip), subject to C(Ip) ≤ Ct,
where Ip is the perturbed image, Q(·) is a quality metric of an image, C(·) is the
identification confidence with respect to a targeted interpolation algorithm, and Ct
is a preset threshold. As the full-color reference image is not available during color
interpolation, we adopt the image that is interpolated by the original gradient-based
interpolation algorithm an approximate reference image in the optimization. The
PSNR with respect to this reference image is taken as the quality metric Q(·),
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and C(·) comes from the identification confidence of the gradient-based algorithm
reported by the 8-class pSVM.
Since it is not always feasible to represent Q(Ip) and C(Ip) in a closed form,
solving for the perturbation parameters θ1 and θ2 is a challenging optimization task.
In this chapter, we take a Monte-Carlo approach that applies Option 3 in Sec-
tion 3.3.1 multiple times to perturb the image, and keep the result that satisfies the
constraint on C(Ip) with highest Q(Ip). Compared to randomized perturbation, this
solution is guided explicitly by the image quality and the identification confidence.
We compare the results of Option 3 and the guided perturbation when Ct = 0.5
for three different noise strengths. Their average PSNR values are roughly equal.
The identification confidences are shown in Fig. 3.9. It can be seen that the pro-
posed approach suppresses the identification confidence for individual images while
maintaining a high image quality; the results also suggest that the approximation
of the reference image by the image interpolated using the gradient-based algorithm
is effective.
3.5.2 Comparison with Kirchner and Böhme [34]
As reviewed in Section 6.1, the work by Kirchner and Böhme [34] is a related
prior work that studies anti-forensic techniques for color interpolation identifica-
tion. Despite the similar goal, the approaches adopted in [34] and the present
chapter differ substantially. Kirchner and Böhme’s work tries to synthesize a linear
dependency among pixels in an image while minimizing the overall distortion. The
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Figure 3.9: Identification confidences as a result of randomized parameter pertur-
bation (a) and the guided parameter perturbation (b). Identification confidence in
(b) ≤ 0.5.
authors proposed to search for a pre-filter that estimates raw samples acquired by the
camera sensor array and applies the bilinear interpolation kernel to the estimated
raw samples to reconstruct the entire image that satisfies the linear dependency.
This approach can be viewed as altering the raw samples to counter the identifi-
cation of color interpolation. In contrast, our proposed approaches leave the raw
samples unchanged, but alter the color interpolation algorithms so that the output
image either deviates from a target color interpolation algorithm or moves toward
the algorithm. It can be viewed that Kirchner and Böhme’s method alters the color
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interpolation after the creation of an image, while our techniques alter the color
interpolation during the creation of an image. Also notice that in Kirchner and
Böhme’s work, even for the case of bilinear interpolation, searching for the pre-filter
(or equivalently, the virtual raw samples) is already computationally challenging,
and it becomes even more difficult to generalize this method to more sophisticated
color interpolation. In comparison, our techniques are less complex and exhibit a
promising generalization capability. It will be an interesting future work to explore
whether Kirchner and Böhme’s work and our approaches can be properly fused for
improved anti-forensic capability.
3.5.3 Reflections on Resilience of Color Interpolation Identification
As motivated in Section 6.1, a fundamental reason for studying anti-forensic
operations against color interpolation identification is to understand the resilience of
identification schemes in an adversarial environment against intentional manipula-
tions of identification results. As demonstrated in the chapter, properly configured
parameter perturbation and algorithm mixing can circumvent and mislead the iden-
tification system while preserving image quality.
We have observed that by perturbing the decision boundaries of gradient di-
rections, the identification confidence can be reduced with minimal reduction in
image quality. The rationale of such effectiveness can be understood as follows.
In order to capture the nature of direction adaptation in prevailing color inter-
polation algorithms (for example, the gradient-based, adaptive color plane, and
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LDI-NAT algorithms considered in this chapter), today’s color interpolation iden-
tification schemes [10, 67] are primarily based on direction classification of pixels
and least-squares estimation of interpolation coefficients for each class. By perturb-
ing the decision boundaries in color interpolation, we are essentially changing the
ways some pixels are interpolated, and this directly makes the estimated color in-
terpolation coefficients deviate from the typical values learnt from the original color
interpolation algorithm, reducing the identification capability. In the meantime,
pixels whose interpolation are more likely to be changed are those near the decision
boundaries. These pixels are not coupled tightly with respective direction classes
in the interpolation algorithm, and none of the classes is likely to interpolate these
pixels particularly well. As such, the image quality does not seriously degrade when
these pixels are interpolated by the methods associated with other direction classes.
On the other hand, our investigation of algorithm mixing, especially linear mix-
ing, suggests the possibility of manipulating identification results while potentially
increasing the image quality. This can be attributed to the independence of interpo-
lation errors caused by individual interpolation algorithms, and one could effectively
counter the identification by properly selecting the modification ratio, given the va-
lidity of error independence. With our work raising the awareness of these inherent
and common issues of color interpolation identification, forensic researchers could
improve identification techniques accordingly to combat anti-forensics.
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3.5.4 Color Interpolation Identification Game
As discussed in Section 3.5.3, because color interpolation identification based
on directional classification is sensitive to pixels near the decision boundaries of
gradient directions, perturbing the decision boundaries can reduce identification
confidence while preserving the image quality. In order to address such vulnera-
bility, a forensic analyst can ignore or treat with lower weights those pixels near
boundaries when estimating the color interpolation coefficients. This may make
the identification system more resilient in the presence of the proposed anti-forensic
operation, but may reduce the estimation accuracy in the absence of anti-forensics.
On the other hand, if the adversary is aware of the forensic analyst’s countermea-
sure, he/she may choose to perform a stronger anti-forensic operation that affects
more pixels, at a cost of more severe image quality degradation. We can see that
there is a dynamic interaction between the forensic analyst and the adversary, and
both the forensic analyst and the adversary’s actions will depend on each other’s
action. It is of interest to understand what actions will be eventually taken, and
what outcome such actions will lead to. It has been shown in recent years that game
theory [49] is a powerful tool for studying strategic decision making, and we formu-
late a color interpolation identification game to address the questions raised above.
Without loss of generality, we will focus on the scenario where the forensic task is to
develop a color interpolation based detector that distinguishes the gradient-based
color interpolation algorithm among others that are listed in Section 3.2.2.
Denote the forensic analyst and the adversary by Player FA and Player AD,
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respectively. In the interaction between the two players, Player FA’s strategy selects
the pixels that will be used for estimating the color interpolation coefficients. More
specifically, for Player FA, we define the typicality for pixels associated individual





































Vx,y −Hx,y, if(x, y) ∈ R1;
Hx,y − Vx,y, if(x, y) ∈ R2;
Ax,y −Dx,y, if(x, y) ∈ R3;
Dx,y − Ax,y, if(x, y) ∈ R4;
(Vx,y +Hx,y + Ax,y +Dx,y)
−1, if(x, y) ∈ R5,
where Vx,y, Hx,y, Ax,y, and Dx,y are defined as in Section 3.2.1. A high typicality
means that the pixel is a typical sample of its associated direction region and is far
from the decision boundary. Player FA’s strategy selects pixels by sorting all pixels
according to their typicality and picking αT% of pixels with highest typicality, where
1 ≤ αl ≤ αT ≤ 100. The lower limit αl is imposed to ensure that there are enough
pixels and the color interpolation coefficient estimation is not ill-conditioned. On
the other hand, Player AD’s strategy selects the noise strength, denoted by Sn, in
the Option 3 described in Section 3.3.1.
For a given pair of strategies (αT , Sn), the utility that Player FA will maximize
is the identification confidence C(αT , Sn), i.e.,
UFA(αT , Sn) = C(αT , Sn).
In contrast, Player AD will minimize the identification confidence while taking ad-
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ditional care of the image quality. The exact utility function associated with Player
AD depends on the exact problem settings. For example, if Player AD can only
minimize the identification confidence subject to a specified constraint Qt on the
image quality Q(αT , Sn), then the utility function can be written as
UAD(αT , Sn) = −C(αT , Sn)× 1 (Q(αT , Sn) ≥ Qt) .
where 1(·) is the indicator function. Since Q(αT , Sn) is independent of αT and is
a decreasing function of the applied noise strength Sn, this utility function can be
rewritten in terms of a noise strength constraint St:
UAD(αT , Sn) = −C(αT , Sn)× 1 (Sn ≤ St) . (3.1)
A key concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium, which is a particular selection
of both players’ strategies with the property that any unilateral strategy change by
a player cannot increase the player’s utility. As such, the Nash equilibrium stands
for a stable pair of strategies that both players would have the incentives to adopt.
For the utility function in (3.1), since the indicator function essentially limits the
range of Sn that leads to a non-zero utility, we can ignore the indicator function by
constraining Player AD’s possible strategy: Sn ∈ [0, St]. As a result, the game is









For the range of αl ≤ αT ≤ 100 where αl = 30 and 0 ≤ Sn ≤ 0.2, we show
in Fig. 3.10 the numerical evaluation results of C(αT , Sn) . In this figure, each
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curve represents the relation between C(αT , Sn) and αT for a fixed Sn; the step
size of Sn between adjacent curves is 0.01. On one hand, as we have discussed in
Section 3.3.1, increasing Sn always reduces the identification confidence. Therefore,
under our setting, Player AD has the incentive to increase Sn as long as it does not
exceed St. On the other hand, the way αT affects the identification confidence is a
function of Sn. When Sn is small (e.g., Sn = 0), the identification confidence remains
unchanged if αT is large and then decreases as αT decreases. This implies that 1)
pixels that are closest to the decision boundaries are not useful for estimating the
color interpolation coefficients and therefore can be ignored during the estimation;
2) pixels far from the decision boundaries (i.e., typical pixels) should be included
in the estimation otherwise the identification confidence will decrease. In contrast,
when Sn is large (e.g., Sn = 0.2), the identification confidence increases as αT
decreases, meaning that more pixels near the decision boundaries should be ignored
in the estimation as they are highly likely to be perturbed. For a moderate value
of Sn (e.g., Sn = 0.1), the identification confidence increases as αT decreases for
larger αT , and the identification confidence decreases as αT decreases for smaller
αT . As a general principle, it can be seen that there is an optimal value of αT that
should be taken by Player FA, which also depends on Sn taken by Player AD. From
Fig. 3.10, it is clear that the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by letting Player
AD take the maximum allowable Sn and then letting Player FA take the optimal
αT accordingly. At the Nash Equilibrium, notice that Player AD can suppress
the identification confidence substantially if a lower image quality is allowed; this
is in line with the fact that perturbing the decision boundaries is a very effective
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Figure 3.10: Identification confidence as a function of the typicality percentage
threshold αT and the noise strength Sn.
anti-forensic technique. Nevertheless, a proper choice of αT can still increase the
identification confidence. For example, when St = 0.1, choosing αT ≈ 76 can
increase the identification confidence by 4% as compared to αT = 100, and when
St = 0.2, choosing αT ≤ 42 increases the identification confidence by 14%. As
a final remark, note that the proposed color interpolation identification game can
be adapted to other settings if the utility functions are redefined accordingly, such
as in [62] where the identification performance and the resulting image quality are
fused in the adversary’s utility function in an additive manner.
3.6 Chapter Summary
Identification of color interpolation has been shown to be a promising approach
to assisting forensic analysis regarding imaging devices and content. However, in or-
der to ensure the trustworthiness of forensic identification especially in an adversar-
ial environment, it is necessary to understand how color interpolation identification
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performs against anti-forensic operations that manipulates identification results.
In this chapter, we have proposed two techniques for countering color interpo-
lation identification. For the technique of parameter perturbation, we have examined
options that achieve different trade-offs between two important factors, the image
quality and the reduction in identification confidence. We show that perturbing the
decision threshold values for pixel classification is a simple yet effective option for
circumventing the identification. For the technique of algorithm mixing that fuses
results from multiple algorithms, we have quantitatively compared different mixing
settings and shown that it is feasible to further mislead the identification system
while preserving the image quality.
To complement the randomized nature of the parameter perturbation tech-
nique, we have formulated it as an optimization problem and proposed a Monte-
Carlo type of approach that maximizes individual image quality with the identifica-
tion confidence kept low. We have also compared our proposed anti-forensics with
the most relevant work [34], and found that our approach has the advantages of lower
complexity and better generalization capability. Based on the analysis presented in
this chapter, we have shed light on the inherent issues of the current identifica-
tion system that has performed well. Such an insight has been further formulated
as a game of color interpolation identification wherein optimal strategies that the
forensic analyst and the adversary can take have been studied. We envision that
the proposed methodology can be applied to examine other imaging processes, and
forensic researchers can exploit the understanding of anti-forensics as guidelines to
design more resilient techniques for digital imaging identification.
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CHAPTER 4
Electrical Network based Time Stamping against
Anti-Forensics
4.1 Chapter Introduction
The recent decade has witnessed a huge amount of multimedia data, in the
form of audio, image, and video, created by various digital recording devices. Once a
multimedia document containing important information is created, it can be easily
distributed through network and social media infrastructure and make rapid and
broad social impacts. However, the digital nature of multimedia data makes it
vulnerable to digital forgeries. For example, many digital editing software packages
can be used to cut a clip from one audio/video file and insert into another, or to
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modify the creation date/time in the metadata field. In view of the feasibility of
digital forgeries, reliable use of multimedia data requires forensic authentication
mechanisms that can identify data origin and detect content tampering.
One emerging direction of digital recording authentication is to exploit a time
stamp originated from the electrical network. This time stamp, referred to as the
electrical network frequency (ENF) signal, is based on the fluctuation of the supply
frequency of a power grid. The nominal value of the ENF is 60Hz in the Americas,
Taiwan, Saudi Arabia and Philippines, and is 50Hz in other regions except Japan,
which adopts both frequencies. It has been found that digital devices such as audio
recorders, CCTV recorders, and camcorders that are plugged into the power systems
or are near power sources may pick up the ENF signal due to the interference
from electromagnetic fields created by power sources [27]. An important property
about the ENF signal is that its frequency is fluctuating around the nominal value
because of varying loads on the power grid. For example, in the United States, the
ENF usually varies between 59.9Hz and 60.1Hz. It has also been shown that the
fluctuations measured at the same time but at two different locations under the
same power grid follow basically a similar trend [27].
The fluctuation of the ENF has been successfully exploited to authenticate
digital recordings [25,27,59,60]. In [27,60], it is demonstrated that the ENF signal
is captured in audio recordings and exhibits a high correlation with the ENF signal
measured from the power mains supply at the same time. As such, the ENF signal
can be used to indicate the creation time of an audio recording provided that a
database of ground-truth ENF signals from the power grid is accessible. An alter-
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native technique in [59] detects the phase discontinuity of the ENF signal, whose
presence suggests where tampering has taken place. Most recently, the work in [25]
validated for the first time the presence of the ENF signal in visual recordings. Op-
tical sensors and video cameras are used to demonstrate that the ENF signal can be
captured from fluorescent lighting and further picked up by video cameras in an in-
door environment. This finding suggests that the same ENF-based time stamp can
be used to authenticate visual data as well. Furthermore, forensic binding of visual
and audio tracks can be performed to verify their temporal synchronization [25].
The promising potential of ENF analysis in forensic investigations is based
on the premise that the ENF signal is present in an audio or video signal in an
unaltered manner. This premise ensures that once the ENF signal is successfully
extracted, it can be used as a truth-telling evidence to verify the recording time,
location, and data integrity. However, similar to many other security and forensics
tasks, there exist adversaries who have the incentives to perform anti-forensic oper-
ations to counteract forensic investigations [18,35]. In order to establish ENF-based
analysis as a credible technique, it is of paramount importance to understand its
robustness against anti-forensic operations, namely, whether the ENF signal can be
compromised, and to what extent. Further, forensic analysts should understand
and address identified vulnerabilities in ENF analysis, and take into consideration
possible improvements that an adversary may make. Anti-forensic operations can
be grouped into physical means and digital processing. The current chapter is a
comprehensive development based on the preliminary work in [14], which, to the
best of our knowledge, is the first work that considers digital-domain anti-forensics
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of ENF-based analysis. We investigate anti-forensic operations that are based on
signal processing techniques, and then devise detection methods targeting these
operations. In response to the detection methods, concealment methods are also
investigated in this chapter, for which various trade-offs are discussed. More funda-
mentally, we develop a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between the
forensic analyst and the adversary, from an evolutionary perspective and a game-
theoretic perspective. These perspectives are then applied to study representative
scenarios and the corresponding optimal strategies are also developed.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the mech-
anism of ENF signal extraction and matching. Section 4.3 investigates ways to re-
move an ENF signal present in a host signal and embed an alien ENF signal into the
host signal. Section 4.4 presents the conditions for anti-forensics detection, which
motivate a few concrete methods for anti-forensics detection. In response to the
detection, Section 4.5 studies concealment techniques, and discusses various trade-
offs. In view of the dynamic nature of the anti-forensics and the countermeasures,
Section 4.6 provides an evolutionary perspective and a game-theoretic perspective
to encompass a wide range of actions and interactions available to a forensic analyst
and an adversary. Representative scenarios are quantitatively studied and optimal
strategies are derived. Section 4.7 summarizes this chapter.
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4.2 ENF Signal Extraction and Matching
In this section, we briefly describe our procedure for extracting the ENF fluc-
tuations from a given signal. Two types of signals are considered in this chapter
for ENF signal extraction and matching. The first is the audio signal that contains
speech recordings mixed with music and sporadic sound activities. All audio signals
used in this chapter have been sampled at 8000Hz with 16-bit quantization precision
and a length of 10 minutes. The 10-minute duration ensures that the audio signal as
well as the ENF fluctuations are sufficiently long for reliable matching based on the
state of the art. Any anti-forensic operations to be investigated in this chapter are
also assumed to be performed on such audio signals. The second type of signal is
the power mains signal that is recorded directly from a power source with a voltage
divider device. This type of signal is used as ground truth for matching.
Our ENF signal extraction basically follows the procedure described in [25].
The recorded signal (either an audio or power mains signal) is first down-sampled
to 500Hz to reduce the complexity of subsequent filtering and frequency estimation.
A filtering process can then be carried out to only retain the signal component that
carries the ENF. The dominant instantaneous frequency in the recorded signal is
then estimated to measure the fluctuations in ENF as a function of time using the
spectrogram based weighted energy method as in [25]. To obtain the spectrogram of
the ENF signal, we divide the signal into overlapping frames of 16 seconds each with
an overlap factor of 50%. A Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of 8192 points is carried
out for each frame. After obtaining the spectrogram, we calculate the weighted
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average frequency in each time bin of the spectrogram by weighing frequency bins
around the nominal values of the ENF with the energy present in the corresponding
frequency. For the estimated frequency fluctuations in ENF signals from the audio
and power mains recordings, we calculate their normalized correlation for different
values of frame lag. The range of the normalized correlation value is between −1
and +1. As an example, Fig. 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) show the spectrograms around
the nominal ENF value of 60Hz of a power mains signal and an audio signal that
were recorded at the same time. Their normalized correlation values as a function
the frame lag is plotted in Fig. 4.1(c). We can see that they exhibit consistent
fluctuations, which is confirmed by the peak normalized correlation value of 0.86 in
Fig. 4.1(c) when the two recordings are synchronized.
4.3 Anti-Forensic Operations against ENF Analysis
In this section, we investigate anti-forensic operations that can counteract
ENF analysis. The general purpose of anti-forensic operations is to alter a host
signal so that the traces left in the host signal that pertain to specific forensic
investigations are removed or changed. While plausible anti-forensic operations and
countermeasures are domain-specific and may seem ad-hoc at times, exploring these
operations and countermeasures is necessary for identifying the available operations
of both the forensic analyst and the adversary. In many anti-forensic tasks against
information protection, the adversary has to preserve the quality of the host signal,
otherwise the quality degradation in itself will indicate the use of anti-forensics and
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(a) Power mains ENF signal (b) Audio ENF signal





















Figure 4.1: (a) Spectrogram of a power mains signal around the nominal ENF value
of 60Hz; (b) spectrogram of an audio signal; (c) normalized correlation between the
two extracted ENF signals as a function of their relative frame lag.
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the host signal will be rejected to be forensic evidence. In our problem, the ENF
signal is restricted around narrow neighborhoods of known frequency locations. As
such, the ENF signal is less likely to be tightly coupled with the main body of the
host signal, making it possible for an adversary to manipulate the ENF signal while
trying to preserve the perceptual quality of the host signal. In this section, we
explore two different levels of anti-forensics, starting with the removal of the ENF
signal and further considering the embedding of an alien ENF signal.
4.3.1 ENF Signal Removal by a Bandstop Filter
The first anti-forensic operation that we consider is to remove the ENF signal
present in a host signal. Since the ENF signal in nature is restricted in a small
frequency region (a.k.a. narrowband hereafter), it is reasonable for an adversary
to apply a bandstop filter to remove the ENF signal. Bandstop filtering (a.k.a.
notch filtering) is a well-studied subject in digital signal processing [54]. A number
of design methodologies, e.g., equiripple filter or Kaiser window filter designs, have
been proposed and implemented in popular software packages such as MATLAB. To
perform bandstop filtering, an adversary selects two main parameters, the stopband
bandwidth and the transition bandwidth. The stopband bandwidth controls the
frequency range wherein the signal is attenuated to the minimum magnitude level.
For the task of ENF signal removal, the choice of stopband bandwidth depends
on the actual range of ENF variation, and ENF signals of wider variations may be
removed using wider stopbands. The second parameter, the transition bandwidth, is
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the range wherein the signal attenuation varies from maximum to minimum. It has
an impact on the filter length and computational complexity; a sharper bandwidth
implies a longer filter and more time required to compute the filter output. Since
accurate ENF matching requires ENF signals of sufficiently long durations, it is
reasonable to assume that audio signals used for anti-forensic operations are also
sufficiently long. Therefore, if the adversary can afford the computational cost,
he/she has enough signal samples to carry out a bandstop filtering with a reasonably
small transition bandwidth. As an example, when the sampling frequency is 8000Hz
which is common for voice signals, we set the stopband bandwidth as ±1Hz, and
the transition bandwidth as 8Hz. If the equiripple linear-phase design is adopted,
the filter has a length of 3627 samples, which corresponds to a duration of about
half a second.
To illustrate the effect of bandstop filtering, we show in Fig. 4.2(a) a typical
Fourier analysis result on a 10-minute audio recording. There is a salient peak
located at 60Hz, which signifies the existence of the ENF signal. The effect of
bandstop filtering for the same audio recording is shown in Fig. 4.2(b), wherein the
peak at 60Hz disappears, suggesting that the ENF signal has been removed. The
removal is further justified by comparing the normalized correlation between the
ENF signal extracted from power mains ground truth and the ENF signal extracted
from the audio recording. We notice that the normalized correlation reduces from
0.86 to −0.10 due to bandstop filtering, suggesting that the ENF signal has been
effectively removed. Furthermore, our subjective tests do not find perceptual audio
quality loss, meaning that the ENF signal removal preserves the main utility of the
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Figure 4.2: (a) The FFT magnitude of an authentic audio clip; (b) the result of
bandstop filtering; (c) the result of bandstop filtering followed by noise filling-in.
host signal.
Although bandstop filtering can remove the ENF signal, a notch of very low
magnitude around the 60Hz frequency can be noticed in Fig. 4.2(b). The notch is
a strong evidence that suggests the use of bandstop filtering, making the resulting
audio recording no longer trustworthy and hence anti-forensics essentially fails. To
erase such traces, an option is to “fill in” the frequency region that has been sup-
pressed by bandstop filtering. We design a bandpass filter with passband bandwidth
±1Hz and transition bandwidth 8Hz and pass a white noise signal through the filter
to obtain a narrowband signal that is then added to the bandstopped audio record-
ing. The noise power is selected so that the resulting narrowband magnitude equals
99














Figure 4.3: ENF embedding result with peak magnitude matched (see Fig. 4.2(a)
for comparison).
the average magnitude of neighboring narrowbands, as shown in Fig. 4.2(c). Since
the narrowband now appears smooth and there is no peak at 60Hz, it becomes more
difficult for the forensic analyst to determine if there was a measurable ENF signal
present at 60Hz.
4.3.2 Embedding Phony ENF Signals
In addition to removing the ENF signal so that the creation time of an audio
recording is no longer available, an adversary may further embed a fake ENF signal
into a host signal so that ENF analysis conducted over the forged audio signal leads
to a wrong estimate for the recording time. This can be done by modulating a
carrier sinusoidal signal of a nominal frequency using a given sequence of instan-
taneous frequencies. In mathematical terms, the carrier signal can be written as
c(t) = M cos(2πfct), where the magnitude M is a constant to be determined. The
modulation is given by









which is the standard form of Frequency Modulation (FM) synthesis [29]. Indeed,











we discuss how to embed a modulated signal into a host signal. As in Section 4.3.1,
we first apply a bandstop filter on the host signal and then fill in bandpassed noise
whose magnitude is matched to neighborhood regions. The magnitude M in (4.1)
is chosen so that the peak FFT magnitude at the nominal frequency remains the
same after the anti-forensic operation, as shown in Fig. 4.3. This can be achieved
using a binary search procedure: starting with an arbitrary guess of M , each it-
eration compares the resulting peak FFT magnitude to the targeted value and in-
creases/decreases M accordingly.
We consider two possible types of synthetic ENF signals. If there is no real
ENF signal from another time or another power grid available for embedding, one
can embed a purely artificial signal such as the sinusoidal variation as shown in
Fig. 4.4(a). The resulting spectrogram has a strong component around 60Hz as
shown in Fig. 4.4(b), and the ENF signal extracted from the forged audio signal
is shown in Fig. 4.4(c), which is a noisy version of Fig. 4.4(a) since the embedded
signal has been mixed into the narrowband. On the other hand, if a real ENF signal
originated from a different time or from another power grid is available, then such an
ENF signal can also be embedded into the host signal to mislead forensic analysis.
Fig. 4.5 shows a power mains ground truth ENF signal, and the corresponding
extracted ENF. We can see that the embedded ENF can also be extracted in a more
noisy form.
The proposed embedding above is based on the FM synthesis. Alternatively,
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Figure 4.4: (a) A purely sinusoidal sequence of instantaneous frequencies to be
embedded as the ENF signal; (b) the spectrogram around 60Hz where a strong
component is present due to the embedding of (a); (c) the corresponding extracted
ENF signal.
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Figure 4.5: Ground-truth ENF signal measured from the power mains (in blue) and
the corresponding extracted ENF signal (in red).
one can perform a “transplantation” operation to duplicate the ENF signal from one
signal into another signal. Specifically, to embed an ENF signal present in a source
audio signal into a host signal, we perform bandpass and bandstop filtering upon
the source and the host signal, respectively, and then add the bandpassed output of
the source signal into the bandstopped output of the host signal. In Fig. 4.6(a), we
show the spectrogram of a transplantation result in which the 60Hz narrowband has
been replaced. The extracted ENF signals from the source signal and the resulting
signal are shown in Fig. 4.6(b). The observation that they tightly overlap indicates
the effectiveness of the transplantation.
4.4 Detecting Anti-Forensics
Our study in Section 4.3 has shown a number of anti-forensic operations that
can counteract ENF analysis. In response to these operations, a forensic analyst
would devise ways to detect the use of anti-forensic operations, so that a forged
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Figure 4.6: (a) Result of narrowband transplantation around 60Hz; (b) ENF signals
extracted from the source signal and from the resulting signal.
audio signal can be identified and rejected as untrustworthy evidence. In this section,
we first discuss conditions under which the detection is feasible, and then propose
effective detection methods.
4.4.1 Detectability of Anti-Forensic Operations
In order to detect anti-forensic operations, we first provide a mathematical
formulation of the anti-forensic operations discussed in Section 4.3. Without loss of
generality, the anti-forensic operations proposed therein create a forged audio signal
by mixing a bandstopped input signal and a bandpassed alien signal (either real
or synthetic). In the frequency domain, the overall anti-forensic operation can be
represented as
Y (ω) = e−jαω [X(ω)Bs(ω) + A(ω)Bp(ω)] , (4.2)
where X(ω) is the frequency-domain representation of the original audio signal in-
dexed by the frequency ω (in Hz), Y (ω) is the resulting audio signal, A(ω) is the
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alien signal, Bs(ω) and Bp(ω) are the frequency responses of the bandstop filter and
the bandpass filter, respectively, and e−jαω is a phase shift corresponding to a pos-
sible time-domain delay of α. The delay is introduced to avoid boundary conditions
due to filtering.
Consider two mutually exclusive cases. For the frequency outside the narrow
passband, |Bs(ω)| ≈ 1 and |Bp(ω)| ≈ 0, and we have
|Y (ω)| ≈ |X(ω)|,
∠Y (ω) ≈ −αω + ∠X(ω) + ∠Bs(ω). (4.3)
In practice, both the bandstop and the bandpass filters can be designed as zero-phase
or linear-phase. As such, the phase term ∠Bs(ω) is linear outside the narrowband,
and by properly selecting the delay α, the two terms −αω and ∠Bs(ω) can be
cancelled out, leading to Y (ω) ≈ X(ω) outside the narrowband. In other words, the
anti-forensic operations basically preserve the host signal outside the narrowband.
On the other hand, for the frequency inside the narrowband, we have |Bs(ω)| ≈ 0
and |Bp(ω)| ≈ 1, and
|Y (ω)| ≈ |A(ω)|,
∠Y (ω) ≈ −αω + ∠A(ω) + ∠Bp(ω) (4.4)
≈ ∠A(ω) + (β − α)ω
provided that the bandpass filter has linear phase in the narrowband. This sug-
gests that Y (ω) ≈ e(β−α)ωA(ω), that is, the output signal inside the narrowband
resembles the alien signal inside the narrowband with a possible phase shift. If the
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bandstop and bandpass filters are designed using the same methods, then α and
β are similar and thus the phase shift is close to zero. To summarize, overall the
proposed anti-forensic operations from Section 4.3 only alter the narrowband and
leave no substantial influence outside the narrowband.
To detect anti-forensic operations, a forensic analyst can carry out a likelihood
ratio (LR) test to compare the likelihoods of a forged audio signal and an unforged





P (O = o, I = i|forged)
P (O = o, I = i|unforged)
(4.5)
=
P (I = i|forged, O = o)
P (I = i|unforged, O = o)
, (4.6)
where we decompose Y into a pair of (I, O) in (4.5), standing for the inside-
narrowband and outside-narrowband components, respectively, and the terms P (O =
o|forged) and P (O = o|unforged) are cancelled out in (4.6) since the anti-forensic
operations do not affect the host signal outside the narrowband.
For the anti-forensic operations proposed in Section 4.3, the forged narrowband
is independent of the signal outside the narrowband. Therefore, the numerator in
(4.6) can be written as PI|A(i), standing for the likelihood of observing a narrowband
i conditioned that the narrowband is from an alien signal. The denominator, on the
other hand, has to account for the dependence of the narrowband on the signal
outside the narrowband. Specifically, the denominator can be denoted as PI|X,o(i),
which is the likelihood of a narrowband i given that the narrowband is native (i.e.,
not from another signal) and the signal outside the narrowband is o. In summary,
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Figure 4.7: (a) Comparison of overall phase associated with unforged and forged
audio signals; (b) comparison of phase around 60Hz associated with unforged and
forged audio signals.
the likelihood ratio is given by PI|A(i)/PI|X,o(i).
From such an analysis, we see that a distinction has to be made between the
original audio signal X and the alien signal A in the narrowband, in order to detect
anti-forensics operations. This is, however, a challenging task, since the adversary
can design the bandstop filter to make the narrowband very “narrow”, especially
compared to the wide frequency range associated with the much higher sampling
frequency. As a result, the characteristics of the original audio signal X and the
alien signal A cannot be easily distinguished in the narrowband. To illustrate such a
difficulty for the forensic analyst, Fig. 4.7(a) shows the overall phase of an unforged
audio signal as well as its forged version, and their difference is hardly noticeable.
Zooming into the narrowband as shown in Fig. 4.7(b), we observe that the two
versions differ in the narrowband, but it is not straightforward to characterize their
statistical difference and to determine which one is forged.
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4.4.2 Inter-Frequency Consistency Check
Section 4.4.1 shows that anti-forensic operations can be detected if one can dis-
tinguish the two distributions PI|A(i) and PI|X,o(i) in the likelihood ratio. Motivated
by this finding, we propose a few ways toward this end.
So far, we have assumed implicitly that a forensic analyst only extracts ENF
signals from a given frequency (e.g., the fundamental frequency of 60Hz). In this
case, it is reasonable for an adversary to focus on tackling this frequency as well.
However, due to the non-linear behavior of electrical circuits, the ENF signal is often
present not only at the fundamental frequency, but also at the harmonic frequen-
cies (120Hz, 180Hz, etc) [1]. As such, in order to detect anti-forensic operations,
the forensic analyst can perform ENF extraction at more than one frequency, and
examine the consistency of multiple ENF estimates. To illustrate this idea, we ex-
tract ENF signals from an audio signal at 60Hz and 120Hz, respectively, and the
results are shown in Fig. 4.8. Note that these two signals have been normalized with
respect to their average values. It can be seen that the two extracted ENF signals
highly overlap with each other, and their normalized correlation is 0.97. The power
of this check depends on the ENF extraction quality at these harmonic frequencies
and is substantially specific to recording conditions. A common observation is that
the magnitude of ENF signal at higher harmonic frequencies can be lower, and the
host audio signal that interferes with the ENF signal is usually stronger at higher
frequencies. As a result, it is usually more difficult to extract reliable ENF signals
at higher harmonic frequencies for such consistency check.
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ENF signal at 60Hz
ENF signal at 120Hz
Figure 4.8: Consistency of ENF signals extracted at the fundamental frequency of
60Hz and a harmonic frequency of 120Hz.
4.4.3 Spectrogram Consistency Check
As an adversary performs the anti-forensic operations proposed in Section 4.3,
the resulting narrowband often exhibits some kind of inconsistency with the signal
outside the narrowband, especially the abrupt boundaries that are easily noticeable
around the nominal ENF. Mathematically, this means the value of PI|X,o(i) is small
for i that introduces abrupt boundaries, which can be used to indicate the existence
of anti-forensics. As an example, consider an adversary that alters the ENF at
120Hz. A typical resulting spectrogram is shown in Fig. 4.9(a), where discontinuity
at the narrowband boundaries centered at 120Hz can be clearly noticed. Such
inconsistency occurs if the host audio signal and the alien audio signal exhibit salient
but unsynchronized temporal variations.
While the spectrogram consistency check is powerful when the signals exhibit
inconsistency, automating this check is non-trivial as in reality, a forensic analyst
has no a priori knowledge about the narrowband range. In order to detect the




Figure 4.9: (a) Spectrogram consistency check for a signal with its 120Hz narrow-
band forged; the obvious inconsistency around 120Hz is highlighted by the dashed
box. (b) Spectrogram with an envelope-adjusted narrowband. Notice the inconsis-
tency around 120Hz in Fig. 4.9(a) is no longer visible.
resolution, which demands a high computational complexity.
4.4.4 Reference-based Detection
In Section 4.4.1, we have seen conditions under which anti-forensic operations
can be detected. In particular, a forged and an unforged audio signal can be distin-
guished if their narrowband characteristics are available. Here we consider a special
setting called reference-based anti-forensics detection, wherein it is assumed that
when a query recording’s ENF signal is to be authenticated, a reference signal with
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Figure 4.10: Variance and kurtosis statistics calculated over 5-second segments on
(a) Day 1 and (b) Day 2.
similar ENF sensing conditions is also accessible. Note that this is in contrast to the
blind detection method that we have discussed previously. The reference-based set-
ting is feasible in many practical scenarios. For example, if the adversary presents
multiple pieces of audio recordings among which some have forged ENF signals,
then the remaining unforged audio recordings can serve as the reference signals. As
another example, consider an audio file that is used as forensic evidence whose au-
thenticity remains to be determined. A forensic analyst can replicate the recording
environment so that the ENF sensing conditions are replicated as well. Note that
the reference-based anti-forensics detection can be seen as a resource-augmented
detection, and as far as we know, this has not been exploited previously.
In the reference-based anti-forensics detection setting, since the reference signal
contains an authentic ENF signal, information about PI|X,o(i) can be learnt from










































Figure 4.11: (a) The source narrowband signal in time domain; (b) the envelope
of the native narrowband signal; (c) the resulting narrowband signal after envelope
matching of (a) to (b).
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one can detect an anti-forensic operation upon a query audio signal if it leads to
a low PI|X(i). To verify this idea, we collect two audio signals recorded on two
different days (10 January and 14 January 2012, respectively). The two audio clips
were made by playing online streaming via the same speaker and recording using
the same microphone. The placement of the microphone and the speaker volume,
however, are not strictly controlled on the two days. For a given audio file whose
narrowband surrounding 60Hz is denoted by B(n), we divide B(n) into segments of
a 5-second duration, and calculate sample statistics for each segment. In particular,
we examine the variance that measures how much each sample spreads out from the
average value, and the kurtosis that measures the “peakedness” as well as the “tail
heaviness” of each sample relative to a normal distribution, defined as





respectively, where B̄ is the average value of B(n) in a segment. We plot the two
statistics corresponding to unforged and forged signals for Day 1 (January 10 2012)
and Day 2 (January 14 2012) in Fig. 4.10(a) and Fig. 4.10(b), respectively. We can
see that both the unforged and the forged signals have stable statistics on the two
days, and unforged and forged signals show noticeably separable statistics values.
Therefore, if we are given any of these two unforged recordings as reference, we
can detect anti-forensics over the other recording by checking the consistency of
the statistics. This idea of reference-based anti-forensics detection can be further
augmented by incorporating other useful statistics.
113
4.5 Concealing Anti-Forensic Traces
Being aware of the anti-forensics detection methods proposed in Section 4.4,
the adversary has the incentives to improve the anti-forensic operations. In this
section, we explore a few possible methods toward this goal, and discuss their trade-
offs.
To cope with the inter-frequency consistency check, the adversary can alter
multiple ENF harmonic frequencies. Two issues have to be addressed by the adver-
sary. First, the alteration has to be performed with regard to possible signal quality
degradation. This is because altering the ENF signal at higher harmonics involves
applying bandstop filtering by the adversary’s anti-forensic operations to the audio
signal at higher frequencies, which usually has richer content. Second, from a foren-
sic analyst’s point of view, as more ENF frequencies are affected, more traces will
be left that can be exploited by the reference-based anti-forensics detection. Never-
theless, as discussed in Section 4.4.2, ENF signals generally can only be extracted
reliably at lower harmonic frequencies. Around these frequencies, host signal quality
degradation is barely noticeable according to our subjective perceptual evaluation.
As such, the two issues above are not serious in practice.
4.5.1 Envelope Adjustment
Recall that the anti-forensic operations proposed in Section 4.3 may result in
inconsistency on the spectrogram. This is because the forged narrowband may have
different temporal magnitude variations. To address this issue, an adversary can
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try to adjust the envelope of the narrowband, so that the adjusted narrowband has
similar temporal variation as the native narrowband. Such adjustment can be done
by means of the Hilbert Transform [29]. Specifically, the Hilbert Transform of a
real-valued narrowband signal in the form of b(t) = e(t) sin(2πfct + φ) is given by






= b(t) + je(t) cos(2πfct+ φ), (4.9)
which includes a purely imaginary part that is π/2 phase-shifted from b(t). As a re-
sult, the amplitude equals to |H{b(t)}| = e(t), where the periodical part sin(2πfct+
φ) is no longer present. The envelope adjustment is done by matching the envelopes





where ba(t) is the source narrowband from the alien signal, and bx(t) is the nar-
rowband of the original signal. Examples of ba(t) and |H{bx(t)}| are shown in
Fig. 4.11(a) and Fig. 4.11(b), and the resulting narrowband is given in Fig.4.11(c). It
is clear that the narrowband from the alien signal has been adjusted with a matched
envelope. The spectrogram after envelope adjustment is given by Fig. 4.9(b), which
no longer exhibits the spectrogram inconsistency as in Fig. 4.9(a).
Envelope adjustment may cause some loss of fidelity in the forged ENF sig-
nal, which can be seen in the following experiment. We perform the narrowband
transplantation proposed in Section 4.3.2 on 13 different audio files. Specifically,
for each audio file, we extract the narrowband from another arbitrarily chosen file
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of normalized correlation values with and without envelope
adjustment. Note that the normalized correlation has been substantially reduced
when envelope adjustment is applied.
and transplant the extracted narrowband into the audio file as described in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. For these 13 audio files, We first calculate the normalized correlation
between the ENF signal present in the alien narrowband and the ENF signal in
the forged narrowband. We then perform envelope adjustment and also calculate
the normalized correlation between the ENF signal in the alien narrowband and the
ENF signal in envelope-adjusted narrowband. As shown in Fig. 4.12, the normalized
correlation reduces from a value close to 1 to about 0.6 as a result of the envelope
adjustment. That is, the envelope adjustment introduces distortion to the ENF,
which suggests that an adversary only has a limited capability of preserving the
fidelity of the spectrogram and forged ENF signal at the same time.
4.5.2 Statistics Matching
We have seen in Section 4.4.4 that due to the limited fidelity of ENF forgery,
anti-forensic operations may be detectable with the aid of certain statistics from a
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reference signal. As such, an adversary also has the incentive to match the statistics
of a forged signal to those obtained from the reference signal. We have found that the
envelope adjustment technique discussed in Section 4.5.1 has the effect of calibrating
the variance and kurtosis statistics, as shown in Fig. 4.13, and therefore serves
as a technique for counteracting the proposed reference-based statistics matching
method as well. However, while the adversary calibrates these two statistics, some
other statistics may be affected. For 13 audio recordings, Fig. 4.14 shows the peak
magnitude at 60Hz on the FFT result with and without envelope adjustment. We
can see that, while the result without envelope adjustment has a wider span, the
result with envelope adjustment exhibits a high consistency. This finding can be
exploited accordingly by the forensic analyst to detect anti-forensic operations. This
phenomenon is fundamental and indicates that some mismatch always takes place
if the adversary only has limited knowledge about how ENF is formed in an audio
signal. For both forensic analysts and adversaries, it is therefore crucial to acquire a
deeper understanding of ENF’s underlying mechanism so as to mimic or to scrutinize
the fidelity of ENF forgery. The relations between forensic analysts’ and adversaries’
actions will be discussed in more depth in the next section.
4.6 Understanding the Interplay between Forensic Analyst and Ad-
versary
Summarizing our proposed forensic and anti-forensic operations developed so
far, we can see a highly dynamic interaction between the forensic analyst and the
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Figure 4.13: Variance and kurtosis statistics matching via envelope adjustment.
Solid and dashed curves represent the statistics associated with authentic data and
envelope-adjusted data, respectively.
























forged without envelope adjustment
forged with envelope adjustment
Figure 4.14: Peak FFT magnitude at 60Hz, with and without envelope adjustment.
Note that the range of peak FFT magnitude is wider before envelope adjustment
and becomes substantially narrower afterwards.
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adversary. In this section, we consider such an interaction from two perspectives.
The first perspective treats the interaction as an evolutionary process, in which
both the forensic analyst and the adversary improve their actions evolutionarily
in response to each other’s action. We then present a game-theoretic perspective,
formulating a game between the forensic analyst and the adversary to highlight their
fundamental relation.
4.6.1 An Evolutionary Perspective
In a security context, system attackers and defenders take advantage of vul-
nerabilities in each other’s strategies and advance their own ones. There is always
an evolution between the two parties, which has been observed in many practical
scenarios such as computer virus v.s. anti-virus competition [50] and the “arms
race” for attacking v.s. securing online reputation systems [66]. In a similar spirit,
such an evolution can also be observed in ENF analysis, resulting in strategies from
simple to complex. As an example, below we list the technical progression from the
discussions in earlier sections of this chapter:
1. A forensic analyst extracts ENF at the fundamental frequency (e.g., 60Hz).
This is sufficient since the ENF signal is dominant in the narrowband at the
fundamental frequency so ENF extraction is accurate, and the forensic analyst
does not examine harmonic frequencies that will incur additional complexity.
2. Given the practice in the previous step, an adversary alters the ENF signal
at the fundamental frequency using anti-forensic operations proposed in Sec-
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tion 4.3 such as removal of the native ENF signals and embedding of a new
ENF signal chosen by the adversary.
3. In the presence of the adversary, the forensic analyst is now motivated to
extract the ENF signal from other harmonic frequencies to examine the inter-
frequency consistency, at the cost of higher complexity.
4. In response to the forensic analyst, the adversary has to make cohesive changes
to the ENF signal at higher harmonic frequencies. However, the adversary
takes the risk of distorting the host audio signal and has a higher chance of
being caught if the forensic analyst applies a reference-based detection.
5. The forensic analyst now has to employ more advanced detection methods at
additional costs, such as checking the spectrogram consistency.
6. In response to the forensic analyst’s improved detection, the adversary can
improve the spectrogram consistency via envelope adjustment. However, this
may sacrifice the fidelity of the forged ENF signal.
7. Given that the adversary has addressed the blind detection methods, the foren-
sic analyst can resort to non-blind detection such as checking the signal statis-
tics with reference signals. The means that the forensic analyst can improve
his/her capability by resorting to more resources.
8. The adversary now improves the ENF forgery fidelity by matching the statis-
tics at the analyst’s disposal. However, we have seen that matching a subset
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of the statistics may lead to mismatch of other statistics, and it is difficult to
perfectly replicate the authentic ENF formation process.
9. Now the forensic analyst has to seek additional anti-forensics detection meth-
ods. The interplay continues.
Evidently, the evolution takes place naturally in a dynamic environment. As
this chapter is among the first effort investigating anti-forensics and countermeasures
of ENF analysis, we expect that increasingly more sophisticated anti-forensic strate-
gies and countermeasures will emerge and can be characterized by the evolutionary
perspective.
4.6.2 A Game-Theoretic Perspective
The interplay between the forensic analyst and adversary in the ENF analysis
can be further understood under a game-theoretic framework that is extended from
the work by Stamm et al. in [63]. Consider the scenario that the forensic analyst
extracts the ENF signal at the fundamental frequency (e.g., 60Hz). An adversary
present in the system can embed a forged ENF signal as discussed in Section 4.3.1
and Section 4.3.2 upon the audio signal so as to convince the forensic analyst that
the audio signal was created at a particular time. As such, for the time information
from the extracted ENF signal to be trusted, the authenticity of the ENF signal
must first be confirmed by an anti-forensics detector to ensure that no anti-forensic
operations have been employed by adversaries.
An anti-forensics detector can be characterized by its structure and perfor-
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mance metrics. In this chapter, we consider a composite construction of anti-
forensics detectors. Specifically, consider a total of N individual detectors Di, 1 ≤
i ≤ N , each relying on different signal characteristics to generate a binary output
T/F with respect to an input audio signal. Output T (True) means anti-forensics
has been performed on the audio signal, and Output F (False) means the opposite
(i.e., the audio signal is authentic). An overall anti-forensics detector Dall can be











T, if Di = T for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
F, otherwise.
(4.11)
Note that in practice, the detector has constraints on its affordable complexity
and the available resources, which determine the individual detectors that can be
incorporated into the overall detector. The performance of the detector is measured
in terms of its detection probability and false alarm probability. The detection
probability is the probability that the detector outputs T given that the anti-forensic
operation is performed, and the false alarm probability is the probability that the
detector outputs T given that the anti-forensic operation is not performed. There
is a common trade-off between these two probabilities of a given detector: the false
alarm probability only increases as the detection probability increases. For a total
false alarm probability Pf,all allowed for Dall that adopts the OR-rule, the forensic
analyst’s strategy selects and configures individual detectors in terms of their false
alarm probabilities, subject to a total false alarm probability equals to Pf,all.
In response to the forensic analyst’s anti-forensics detection, the adversary will
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seek to hide the traces of anti-forensics. Complexity and resource constraints can
also be imposed on the adversary’s actions, and the adversary has to select his/her
strategy under the constraints so that the forensic analyst’s detection capability is
minimized while the forged ENF signal is maximally preserved. Given a pair of the
forensic analyst’s and the adversary’s strategies, the utility that the forensic analyst
will maximize is the total detection probability of anti-forensics Pd,all. In contrast,
the adversary’s utility is to minimize Pd,all, with additional penalty when distortion
is introduced to the ENF signal that the adversary intends to embed.
The specific operations proposed in Section 4.4 and 4.5 can be studied under
the game-theoretic formulation. In terms of the forensic analyst’s detector construc-
tion, if more strict constraints on complexity and resources are imposed, then the
forensic analyst may only use the low-complexity inter-frequency consistency check
as the anti-forensics detector. If a higher complexity is permitted, then the spectro-
gram consistency detector can be incorporated into the overall detector. Further-
more, if the resources accessible to the forensic analyst are enhanced, for example
via a reference signal or via an improved understanding of the ENF formation mech-
anism, then forensic analyst can construct an even more sophisticated detector. On
the adversary’s side, altering ENF at multiple frequencies is effective against the
inter-frequency consistency check, but cannot resist other types of anti-forensics de-
tection. Nonetheless, if higher complexity is allowed for the adversary, he/she can
employ envelope adjustment to reduce the anti-forensics detection probability, al-
though at the same time, the forged ENF signal may suffer from distortion. Similar
to the forensic analyst, if more resources are available to the adversary, such as an
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improved knowledge of the ENF formation mechanism, then the adversary can also
improve the anti-forensic capability.
4.6.3 Quantitative Evaluation of Representative Scenarios
To establish a concrete and quantitative understanding of the evolutionary and
game-theoretic perspectives, we study the scenarios listed in Fig. 4.15 that represent
different stages during the ENF “arms race” and can take place in the game-theoretic
formulation of ENF forgery. To facilitate the investigation and comparison of play-
ers’ possible strategies, we first prepare audio recordings to quantitatively test the
performance of anti-forensics and countermeasures. Specifically, we collect 100 au-
dio segments by playing online audio streaming via a speaker and recording using
a microphone. Each segment is 10-minute long and is 2-minute apart from one
another. We consider operations introduced in Section 4.4 and 4.5 that can be
performed by the forensic analyst and the adversary, including the inter-frequency
consistency check (IF) discussed in Sec. 4.4.2, the statistics comparison around 60Hz
(STAT-60) in Sec. 4.4.4, ENF manipulation of multiple harmonic frequencies (MF)
in Sec. 4.5, envelope adjustment via Hilbert Transform (EA) in Secs. 4.5.1 and 4.5.2,
and the peak spectrum magnitude check around 60Hz (PEAK-60) in Sec. 4.5.2.
These acronyms are summarized in Fig. 4.15(a). The dotted arrows in Fig. 4.15(b)
represent the causal relations, i.e., one player’s action triggers the other player’s
action.


























































































Analyst IF STAT-60 
Adversary MF 
Scenario 3 
Analyst IF STAT-60 PEAK-60 
Adversary MF EA 
Scenario 3s 
Analyst STAT-60 PEAK-60 
Adversary EA 
(b)
Figure 4.15: (a) Acronyms of operations and (b) representative scenarios in the ENF
forgery game formulation. See Section 4.6.2 for detailed elaborations.
the fundamental frequency of 60Hz, and the forensic analyst performs the inter-
frequency consistency check (i.e., the IF detection) in order to detect ENF forgery.
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of the detection, i.e., the re-
lation between the false alarm probability and the detection probability, is shown
in Fig. 4.16. The nearly perfect detection performance suggests that the inter-
frequency ENF discrepancy can effectively detect ENF manipulations at a single
frequency.
Scenario 2 considers the further interaction when the adversary performs the
ENF manipulation of multiple harmonic frequencies in order to counteract the foren-
sic analyst’s inter-frequency consistency check. Assume that the forensic analyst has
access to a reference signal with similar statistics, then the forensic analyst can per-
form the STAT-60 detection to verify the ENF signal’s statistics present at 60Hz.
Fig. 4.17(a) shows the substantial performance drop of the IF detection due to the
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Figure 4.16: ROC curve of IF detection that performs inter-frequency consistency
check.
multi-frequency ENF manipulation, and it is clear that the inter-frequency consis-
tency check is no longer effective in this scenario. However, STAT-60 the compares
the statistics at 60Hz remains discriminative as shown in Fig. 4.17(b), and therefore
if a composite detector is constructed using IF and STAT-60, STAT-60 should play
a dominant role and the forensic analyst should always assign the available false
alarm probability to STAT-60.
In Scenario 3, the adversary further counteracts STAT-60 by applying envelope
adjustment via Hilbert Transform. As discussed in 4.5.2, envelope adjustment can
match the statistics used by STAT-60, which is also confirmed in Fig. 4.18(a), where
one can see that the STAT-60 detection essentially becomes a random guess in the
presence of envelope adjustment. On the other hand, however, the downside to
envelope adjustment from the adversary’s perspective is that the forged ENF signal
may be distorted as shown in Fig. 4.12. A feasible compromise available to the
adversary is to control the strength of envelope adjustment by, for example linear
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Figure 4.17: (a) ROC curve of IF detection, with and without the multi-frequency






where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 denotes the strength of envelope adjustment. It can be seen
that a higher α makes the adjusted envelope more similar to that of the native
narrowband. A higher α also introduces more distortion to the forged ENF signal
as discussed earlier. Now, in response to the practice of envelope adjustment, the
forensic analyst applies the PEAK-60 detection that scrutinizes the peak spectrum
magnitude at 60Hz, whose ROC curves with and without full envelope adjustment
(α = 1) are shown in Fig. 4.18(b). We can see that PEAK-60 behaves as a random
guess in the absence of envelope adjustment, but becomes discriminative in the
presence of envelope adjustment.
Nash Equilibria and Optimal Strategies: We now consider the optimal strate-
gies of the forensic analyst and the adversary as well as the resulting forensic and
anti-forensic performance in Scenario 3. Here, the notion of strategy optimality
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Figure 4.18: ROC curve of (a) STAT-60; (b) PEAK-60, with and without envelope
adjustment (EA).
refers to a Nash Equilibrium, namely, the status in which no player can increase
his/her own utility via unilateral strategy changes. As Scenario 3 involves three
detectors (IF, STAT-60, and PEAK-60), the forensic analyst’s strategy is to con-
figure the composite detector by setting the false alarm probabilities of individual
detectors subject to the total false alarm probability. This strategy has two degrees
of freedom and is more difficult to observe directly. To gain some useful insights,
we first consider a simplified version Scenario 3s, which does not involve multiple
harmonic frequencies (i.e., inter-frequency consistency check and multi-frequency
ENF manipulation are not used).
In Scenario 3s, for an assigned value of Pf,all, the forensic analyst searches for
possible values of Pf,PEAK−60 that can be combined with a corresponding Pf,STAT−60
to yield a total false alarm probability of Pf,all. On the other side, the adversary
considers different values of envelope adjustment strength α, subject to any fidelity
constraint on the forged ENF signal. that can be mapped into a corresponding
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constraint on α. Since the goal of the forensic analyst is to detect anti-forensics and
the goal of the adversary is to evade the detection, we choose the utility function
of the forensic analyst as the overall detection probability Pd,all, and the utility
function of the adversary as −Pd,all. It can be seen that this is a zero-sum game
setting, for which the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of this game is given by the min-max
(or equivalently max-min) solution. That is,
(P ∗f,PEAK−60 , α










subject to α ≤ αT
(4.12)
for some αT that upper-bounds the envelope adjustment strength and therefore
controls the fidelity of the forged ENF signal.
Fig. 4.19 illustrates the utility function Pd,all for Pf,all = 10% with respect to
different values of Pf,PEAK−60 and α. We have several observations: 1) Pd,all generally
decreases as α increases, but certain “rebounds” can also be seen for larger values
of Pf,PEAK−60. The decreasing trend of Pd,all can be attributed to the fact that
α’s increase reduces the STAT-60 detector’s discriminative capability, which may
not be well compensated by the improved detection capability of PEAK-60 until
a minimum value of Pd,all. After that, PEAK-60 begins to compensates for the
lost detection capability of STAT-60 and thus Pd,all increases. 2) Pd,all generally
increases as Pf,PEAK−60 increases. For larger α, this is because PEAK-60 is more
discriminative than STAT-60, and even for smaller α when PEAK-60 behaves nearly
as random guess, the detection probability of STAT-60 may not increase as rapidly
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with its false probability as of PEAK-60, and therefore incorporating PEAK-60 by
choosing a higher Pf,PEAK−60 still increases the overall detection probability.
For the illustrative example, note that when there is no constraint imposed
on the envelope adjustment strength α, a particular Nash Equilibrium (NE) can be
found as (P ∗f,PEAK−60, α
∗) = (10%, 80%). That is, the equilibrium takes place when
the forensic analyst assigns all of its false alarm probability to PEAK-60, and the
adversary uses a large but not maximal strength when adjusting the envelope. In
case the envelope adjustment strength is upper-bounded by αT < 80%, the Nash
Equilibrium becomes (10%, αT ).
For the unconstrained case, we show the NE ROC curve in Fig. 4.20(a), which
can be obtained by varying the value of Pf,all and finding the corresponding Nash
Equilibrium and Pd,all. It can be seen that the detection performance is lower than
the solid curve in Fig. 4.18(a) that represents the optimal performance of STAT-60
when no adversarial operation is involved. It is also lower than the dashed curve in
Fig. 4.18(b), which is the optimal performance of PEAK-60 when the full applica-
tion of envelope adjustment is known in advance. Such degradation in identification
performance comes from the manipulation of the adversary; nevertheless, the de-
tection performance is retained to a large extent if the forensic analyst adheres to
the Nash Equilibrium. Another observation is shown in Fig. 4.20(b) that the Nash
Equilibrium strategy for the adversary, i.e., the envelope adjustment strength α,
decreases as Pf,all increases. This can be understood from Fig. 4.18, where one can
see that STAT-60 without envelope adjustment exhibits a higher detection perfor-
mance than PEAK-60 with envelope adjustment in the low false alarm probability
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Figure 4.19: Overall detection probability Pd,all as utility function for Pf,all = 10%,
evaluated with respect to joint selection of Pf,PEAK−60 and α. An unconstrained NE
can be found at (Pf,PEAK−60, α) = (10%, 80%).
regime. Therefore, when Pf,all is small, the adversary’s better strategy is to moti-
vate the forensic analyst to use PEAK-60 by maximizing the envelope adjustment
strength. As Pf,all increases, the detection performance of PEAK-60 improves, the
above strategy becomes less effective, and the adversary naturally reduces the en-
velope adjustment strength.
Scenario 3 essentially shares the Scenario 3s’ properties. Since its utility func-
tion involves three dimensions and is more difficult to visualize, we just plot its NE
ROC curve in Fig. 4.21, shown jointly with the NE ROC curve of Scenario 3s for
the sake of comparison. We can see that the two ROC curves essentially overlap,
which implies that the inter-frequency consistency check and the multi-frequency
ENF manipulation do not play meaningful roles at the Nash Equilibrium. Other
observations, especially that the envelope adjustment strength decreases as the total
false alarm probability increases, are also valid in Scenario 3.
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Figure 4.20: (a) NE ROC curve of Scenario 3s; (b) The optimal envelope adjustment
strength α∗ at NE with respect to total false alarm probability Pf,all.
In summary, our quantitative evaluations of representative scenarios presented
in this section provides an important understanding on the optimal strategies of the
forensic analyst and the adversary. In particular, we can see that the adversary can
effectively reduce the detection performance by properly selecting the envelope ad-
justment strength, but in the meantime, the forensic analyst’s optimal configuration
of the composite detector can minimize such a performance degradation. Also note
that the game-theoretic analysis here is generic in nature, and it can be extended
to other scenarios as well when new anti-forensic operations and countermeasures
become available.
4.7 Chapter Summary
The time stamp based on the electrical network frequency (ENF) has been
shown to be a promising tool for digital recording authentication. In this chap-
ter, we examined the robustness of this time stamp against anti-forensics under
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Figure 4.21: NE ROC curves of Scenario 3 and Scenario 3s, which are essentially
overlapped.
adversarial environments. We have investigated anti-forensic operations that can
remove and alter the ENF signal present in a host audio signal. We have devel-
oped a mathematical framework for ENF modification, which not only entails the
effectiveness of ENF modification and challenges of anti-forensics detection, but also
motivates detection methods from a forensic analyst’s point of view. Concealment
techniques in response to the anti-forensics detection are further proposed and their
corresponding trade-offs are discussed. To understand the dynamic nature of the
forensic analyst-adversary interplay, we have developed an evolutionary perspective
and a game-theoretic perspective, which can be used to characterize a wide range of
actions that may take place. Representative scenarios that involve different actions
have also been quantitatively evaluated and the optimal strategies have also been
derived.
As this chapter has established a methodology for studying the robustness of
ENF-based time stamps, our future work will include more experiments that cover a
variety of testing conditions, geographic areas and recording devices. Equally impor-
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tant is to develop a deeper understanding of the ENF formation mechanism as well
as individual anti-forensic operations and countermeasures. Certain physical means,
such as electromagnetic shielding or the limited frequency response of microphones,
may also affect the presence of ENF signals and warrant more research. In light
of the potential employment of ENF analysis for digital recording authentication,
we envision that its robustness will receive increasing attention, and research along




Camera Unit Identification using Low-bit-rate Video
5.1 Chapter Introduction
Pocket-sized digital cameras and cell-phones with cameras have become pop-
ular and generated a large amount of digital images and videos. Compared to im-
ages, videos can capture more visual information, and therefore is an ideal format
for recording rich and dynamic content.
Accompanying the growing importance of digital videos, concerns regarding
their origin and authenticity have been raised and are receiving increasing attention.
A systematic study of digital video forensics that answers different questions about a
video’s acquisition and processing history is important in order to establish the trust-
worthiness of digital videos. Several previous works on video forensics considered
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the identification of source devices and tampering operations. In [12], Chen et al.
extended the source camera identification technique based on the Photo-Response
Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [24] from image to video. McCloskey [46] proposed to take
into account the influence of video content on the achievable performance of [12].
On tampering detection, Wang and Farid [74] demonstrated that frame insertion or
deletion that are usually involved in video forgery form forensic traces and therefore
can be detected. Luo et al. [45] showed that MPEG compression introduces differ-
ent block artifacts into different types of frames, which can be used to detect video
recompression.
In this chapter, we examine the source camera identification problem, with a
focus on cell-phone cameras. We focus on cell-phone cameras because more cell-
phones are now equipped with the video recording capability, and we foresee that
more videos will be generated by cell-phones in the future owing to their superior
convenience. Previous works such as [39, 44] have developed and enhanced the
methodology of source camera identification by means of the PRNU [24] which
we will review shortly. These works considered the case when still images from
the camera under investigation are used for PRNU estimation and matching. This
methodology is extended in [12] to use videos, and the reported accuracy is promising
when the test video is long enough. However, as also noticed in [46], the task
of source camera identification using videos is more challenging than the image
counterpart due to the degraded visual quality of videos. This problem is even more
serious when we consider videos generated by cell-phone cameras that suffer from
much stronger compression. Nevertheless, the rich temporal information in videos
136
can help, if properly exploited, to achieve more accurate source camera identification.
As a video is composed of multiple frames, how each frame should be used to
jointly estimate the PRNU deserves careful exploration. In this chapter, we study
the effect of video compression, and show that the reliability of frames for PRNU es-
timation can be considerably different, attributed to different levels of compression.
We propose new mechanisms for PRNU estimation that leverage such a difference,
and show that more accurate source camera identification can be achieved with
fewer frames used.
5.2 PRNU for Source Camera Identification
We review the basic principles of source camera identification based on PRNU.
For a more detailed discussion, please refer to [24]. The manufacturing imperfec-
tions of charge-coupled device (CCD) and complementary metal-oxide semiconduc-
tor (CMOS) sensors result in slight variations of the sensitivity of sensors to the
incident light. The pattern of sensitivity variation, commonly referred to as the
Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [24], can be seen as the “fingerprint”
unique to individual imaging devices. It has been shown in [24] that, by applying a
denoising filter on the image F, the difference between F and its denoised version can
be approximated by V = FK+M, where V is referred to as the noise residual, K is
the PRNU pattern matrix that captures the variation pattern of sensor sensitivity,
and M is the modeling noise that accommodates various noise sources, including
shot noise, dark current, read-out noise, quantization and compression noise, and
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the imperfection of the denoising filter. Please be informed that all multiplication
operations throughout this chapter are element-wise.
For source camera identification using output images, it is usually assumed
that N images taken by the camera under investigation are available for PRNU
estimation. When the modeling noise M is assumed as white Gaussian with per-
pixel variance identical across all the images, a maximum-likelihood estimate of K








where Vi and Fi are the ith noise residual and ith image, respectively [24].
The typical setting of source camera identification assumes the camera under
investigation is available. To match test images against this camera, a training
procedure is performed first to obtain a reference PRNU. Ideal training images are
those with smooth content and high yet unsaturated luminance. Then a PRNU
estimate from the test image is calculated using Eq. (5.1) and compared against the
reference PRNU. A popular sub-optimal similar metric between two PRNU matrices
S1 and S2 is the Normalized Cross-Correlation (NCC) given by
NCC(S1,S2) =
(S1 − S̄1)⊗ (S2 − S̄2)
‖S1 − S̄1‖‖S2 − S̄2‖
,
where ⊗ denotes the dot product, and S̄1 and S̄2 are the average value of S1 and
S2, respectively. A correlation matrix C can be obtained where C(i, j) is the NCC
value between S1 and S2 when S2 is shifted by (i, j). Another PRNU similarity
metric that compensates for the camera-specific NCC range is called the Peak to
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where Cmax = maxi,j C(i, j), Npeak is a small neighborhood surrounding the shift
corresponding to Cmax, and n is the size of S2. PCE characterizes if the maximum
correlation is much higher than the average correlation, or in other words, if there
is a peak in the correlation matrix. We adopt the PCE metric in this chapter.
PRNU-based source device identification using output videos has been studied
in previous works [12] and [46]. Particularly, in [12], PRNU is utilized to determine
if two video clips come from the same source camcorder. The main idea is to treat
each frame as one image in a video consisting of N frames, and then apply Eq.
(5.1) to obtain an estimate based on the multiple frames, i.e., the entire video. It is
advised in [12] that each frame be treated equally mainly to reduce the complexity
of implementation. The authors reported that source camcorder can be identified
as long as the video is sufficiently long. In [46], the method described above is
examined with special attention to the influence of video content. It was observed
that edges can be mistaken as noise by the denoising filter, which is further amplified
if frames in the video are highly correlated. It is proposed in [46] to assign higher
weights to pixels in smooth areas to alleviate this problem, which actually shares a
similar spirit with other image-based PRNU estimation techniques such as [39].
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5.3 Compression Effect on PRNU Estimation
Most of cell-phone cameras today support low-bit-rate video coding standards
MPEG-4 AVC/H. 264. The typical resolution ranges from 320 × 240 to 480 ×
352 pixels, and the bit rate may vary between 300 to 1000 kbps. Such strongly-
compressed videos are generated in order to meet a more stringent storage-space
constraint and to reduce the transmission effort. Strong compression may lower the
accuracy of PRNU estimation, as it creates blocking artifacts and coarsely quantized
intensity levels, and eliminates a significant amount of content detail that carry the
PRNU-induced noise.
We take an empirical approach to understand the impact of compression on
PRNU estimation, in particular, if different frames have different reliability for
PRNU estimation [15]. As it is a non-trivial task to calculate the frame quality
without the uncompressed video for reference, we judge the frame reliability in
terms of their correlation with the reference PRNUs. We collect 5 recently-released
cell-phones with video recording capability as listed in Table 5.1. Twenty videos
that contain indoor and outdoor scenes of 30 seconds are taken with each camera.
Interestingly, we find that all frames are either I- or P-frames, and no B-frame is
found. We obtain the reference PRNUs of all these cameras according to the pro-
cedure recommended in Sec. 5.4. The sequence of frame type of each video can be
represented as {I, P1, P2, P3, P4, . . . , I, P1, P2, P3, P4, . . . , I, . . .}. The PRNU of each
test video can be estimated with the subset of frames corresponding to the same
symbol (i.e., the same offset from I-frames).
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Table 5.1: Cell-phone cameras used in our experiment
Index Model Format Resolution
1 RIM Blackberry 9530 3GP 480× 352
2 Sony Ericsson W705a MP4 320× 240
3 Motorola Cliq 3GP 352× 288
4,5 Apple iPhone 4 (×2) MOV 568× 320
For each camera, the PCE value averaging over 20 videos with matched against
reference PRNU is shown in Fig. 5.1. The PCE value is much higher (about twice)
when the PRNU is estimated using I-frames, but the difference in PCE between
different subsets of P-frames is not obvious. That is, the PRNU extracted from I-
frames are more correlated to the reference PRNU than those from P-frames, which
implies that I-frames are more reliable than P-frames for PRNU estimation. In the
meantime, the average PCE values associated with P1, P2, P3, and P4 have similar
values of 31.8, 30.6, 32.7, 32.0, respectively, indicating that P-frames with different
offsets have similar reliability for PRNU estimation.
5.4 Reference PRNU Estimation
In order to perform resilient matching between the reference PRNU and the
PRNU from test videos, it is crucial to obtain reliable reference PRNUs in the train-
ing process. As compression poses a critical impact on PRNU estimation as shown in
Sec. 5.3, it is reasonable to favor I-frames if enough I-frames are available. Besides,
since the compression under our consideration is strong, various noise sources may
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Figure 5.1: Average PCE for different offsets from I-frames.
be dominated by compression noise that is highly content-dependent. One should
avoid the use of videos with (nearly) static content otherwise the overall modeling
noise associated with different frames in a video will be unfavorably correlated and
cannot be easily removed through frame averaging.
These observations motivate us to use multiple short videos, instead of one
long video, to obtain the reference PRNU. Specifically, a total of N short videos
(shorter than 1 second) that contain smooth and bright scenes are first collected,
and then the first frame of each video will be used to jointly estimate the reference
PRNU. Since practically the first frame in each video is an I-frame, there are as many
I-frames as the number of training videos available for reference PRNU estimation.
Moreover, because these I-frames are from different videos, it is expectable that they
will have lower correlation with one another.
We compare this mechanism of reference PRNU estimation with two alterna-
tives: 1) using the first P-frames (i.e., the second frame in a video) from multiple
videos and 2) using a long video with static content. We refer to these three mech-
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trained with 1st I−frames from 50 videos
trained with 1st P−frames from 50 videos
trained with 500 frames from 1 static video
Figure 5.2: Comparison of different mechanisms for reference PRNU estimation, in
terms of the achievable PCE value for different test-video frame numbers. Black-
berry 9530 is used.
anisms as MI , MP , and ML, respectively. For MI and MP , 50 short videos are
used to estimate the reference PRNU. For ML, a long video with 500 static frames
is used to estimate the reference PRNU. In Fig. 5.2, we show for the three mecha-
nisms the PCE values averaging over 20 test videos with respect to different frame
numbers from the test video. One can see that MI is consistently superior to MP ,
which increases as more frames from the test video are used. On the other hand,
estimating the reference PRNU using a long but static video is much less effective.
If the reference PRNU is obtained in such a way, then even if much more frames
in the test video are used, then correlation between the test-video PRNU and the
reference PRNU is still much smaller.
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5.5 Efficient PRNU Matching by Frame Reordering and Weighting
We have shown that I-frames extracted from videos are more reliable than
P-frames for PRNU estimation. Nevertheless, the average PCE value when all
frames are used is 300.9, much higher than the average PCE value of 72.3 if only
I-frames are used. It is therefore reasonable to use all the frames in a video to
obtain a PRNU estimate, and this is in line with the conclusion made in [12]. Two
issues, however, need to be addressed more carefully. First, using all the frames in
a video can be prohibitively time-consuming, since all frames have to go through a
denoising process with non-negligible complexity to extract the frame-wise PRNU.
Besides, since I-frames and P-frames have distinct reliability, they should be treated
differently when combined for PRNU estimation.
To address the first issue, if the number of frames that can be processed in
PRNU estimation is limited, a reasonable choice is to first use more reliable frames,
i.e., I-frames. This is feasible in terms of video decoding complexity since I-frames
are at the beginning of the Group of Picture (GOP) and can be easily located.
In this chapter, we assume that information required to decode the subsequent P-
frames are stored after an I-frame is completely decoded, so that the decoding of
P-frames can be performed without re-decoding the I-frames. For the second issue,















which indicates that a frame should be assigned a weight inversely proportional to
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its modeling noise variance. We assume that all I-frames have the same modeling
noise variance of σ2I , and all P-frames have the same modeling noise variance of





mainly determined by the level of compression noise, and therefore should be directly
related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of each frame type. Estimating the SNR
using only the compressed video is in general a difficult task [7]; in this chapter, we
arbitrarily take σ2P = 2σ
2
I , or equivalently assign weights 2 and 1 to I-frames and P-
frames, respectively. Please be reminded that this setting is merely to demonstrate
that proper weighting may improve PRNU estimation.
We compare the sequential frame parsing (i.e., reading frames from the begin-
ning of the video in a sequential manner), the proposed frame reordering mechanism
with equal weights, and the proposed frame reordering mechanism with the 2 : 1
weights. Fig. 5.3 shows the PCE values for these three mechanisms, averaging over
totally 100 videos from 5 cameras. One can see that 1) with more frames, the dif-
ference between the match and mismatch cases becomes more obvious; 2) the frame
reordering mechanism significantly increases the PCE values, especially when the
frame number is smaller; 3) for all the frame numbers, the 2 : 1 weights assigned
to I-frames and P-frames create additional increase in PCE. Note that these two
mechanisms do not increase the PCE in the mismatch case.
We also compare these mechanisms in terms of their source camera identifica-
tion accuracy. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for the three
mechanisms for two frame numbers 100 and 300 are shown in Fig. 5.4 and 5.5, where
the horizontal axis is the false alarm rate and the vertical axis is the detection rate.
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match, frame reordering with 2:1 weight
mismatch
Figure 5.3: Average PCE value with respect to different number of frame.


















frame reordering with 2:1 weight
Figure 5.4: ROC curve with 100 frames for PRNU estimation.
One can see that with an increased number of frames, the accuracy is improved for
all the three mechanisms. Frame reordering increases the accuracy especially for a
smaller number of frames, and further improvement can be obtained by assigning
higher weights to more reliable frames. It is also noteworthy that frame ordering
and unequal weighting have a complimentary nature: the former is advantageous if
only a limited number of frames can be processed, while the latter is more useful if
more frames are available.
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frame reordering with 2:1 weight
Figure 5.5: ROC curve with 300 frames for PRNU estimation.
5.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explore the impact of compression on source camera iden-
tification using the Photo-Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) extracted from com-
pressed videos. We consider videos generated by cell-phone cameras, which are
strongly compressed to reduce the storage and transmission requirement. Although
the authors in [12] stated that each frame in a video should be treated equally, we
find that different frame types (I and P) actually have different levels of reliabil-
ity for PRNU estimation. Motivated by this observation, we propose an effective
mechanism for estimating the reference PRNU pattern. Moreover, we show that by
reordering and weighting the frames in a video according to their reliability, we can
achieve more accurate source camera identification with fewer frames used.
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CHAPTER 6
Empirical Frequency Response for Digital Image Forensics
6.1 Chapter Introduction
In the past decade, due to the widespread popularity of digital cameras and
online image hosting services, a large number of images have been generated and
distributed. At the same time, the advent of various image editing software packages
has made altering the image content easier even for novice users. Since the authen-
ticity of digital images impacts on how we use it, content integrity has become an
important forensic issue. For a given image, one may ask if it has been tampered or
manipulated and further by what type of tampering operation. This chapter focuses
on the latter question and presents a framework to determine the type of tampering
operation that has been performed.
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Prior work fall into two main categories. In the first category, methods have
been proposed to detect resampling [58], JPEG compression [43], and Gamma cor-
rection [20], by extracting certain salient features that would help distinguish such
tampering from unprocessed images. Although these methods can be employed to
identify the type and the parameters of the tampering operation, an exhaustive
search over a pool of operations is required to detect tampering and to identify
the type of tampering operation. Therefore, there is a strong need for universal
technique to detect and identify tampering.
In the second category, classifier-based approaches to detect image tamper-
ing were proposed in [4] [23], where features based on analysis of variance [4] and
higher order wavelet statistics [23] have been used. In [69], a framework was pro-
posed by modeling tampering as a combination of a linear and shift-invariant (LSI)
and a non-LSI part. The authors present methods to estimate the LSI part of ma-
nipulation operation and compare the estimate to an identity transform to detect
tampering. These work aim to just detect tampering and therefore focus on answer-
ing whether the given image was tampered or not, and are not for identifying the
type of tampering.
In this work, we propose a framework based on the Empirical Frequency Re-
sponse (EFR) that aims to identify the manipulation type. We show that many
classes of LSI or non-LSI image processing operations, such as resampling, JPEG
compression, and non-linear filtering, exhibit distinctive patterns in their EFRs.
Theoretical reasoning supported by experimental results also verifies the effective-
ness of this method for identifying the type of a tampering operation.
149
We also find that the EFR potentially can be used for other applications.
Specifically, the EFR has dependency on the camera model used to generate the
image, and such dependency can thus be leveraged to identify the camera model.
Our study also shows that the dependency is a function of the frequency region,
which suggests the need for a proper selection of the frequency region.
This chapter is organized as follows. We define the Empirical Frequency Re-
sponse (EFR) in Section 6.2 and show distinctive EFRs. The results on using the
EFR as a tampering analysis tool are discussed in Section 6.3. The application of
EFRs for camera model identification is presented in Section 6.4. Since the EFR
is, in fact, not readily available in practice, we discuss methods to estimate EFR in
Section 6.5 just based on the output image, and propose approches to improve the
accuracy. We summarize this chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2 The Empirical Frequency Response
It is well known that linear and shift-invariant (LSI) systems can be char-
acterized by their frequency responses. For example, a 3 × 3 average filter has a
2-D sinc-like frequency response as shown in Fig. 6.1(a) and the frequency response
of an identity system whose output equals to the input is flat. However, image
processing operations are often non-LSI and input-independent frequency response
is not defined for such systems. In this chapter, we represent such manipulations
using the Empirical Frequency Response (EFR) [30]. For different types of tamper-
ing, we show that the EFR is consistent and can therefore be employed to identify
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(a) 3 × 3 average filter-
ing
(b) down-sampling by 2 (c) JPEG QF=60 (d) 3 × 3 median filter-
ing
Figure 6.1: Typical EFRs for four different manipulations. The EFR is shown in a
log scale with the center part representing the low-frequency region.
manipulation type.
The EFR of a system HX(ω) is defined as the ratio of the Discrete-Space






The EFR is input-dependent for non-LSI systems, and when the system is LSI, it
coincides with the frequency response. Fig. 6.1 illustrates typical EFRs for different
manipulations including (i) down-sampling by 2 (denoted by ↓ 2; the notation ↑
is similarly for up-sampling); (ii) JPEG compression with quality factor (QF) 60,
and (iii) 3 × 3 median filtering (a popular non-linear filter). We obtain similar
or “consistent” EFRs for a majority of images in our database; this suggests that
even though the EFRs are signal dependent for non-LSI systems, the differences
are often minor and similar manipulations produce similar EFRs. In the following,
we analyze the reasons behind this consistency for operations such as resampling,
JPEG compression, and median filtering.
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6.2.1 The EFR for Resampling Operations
Natural images, especially those captured by cameras, possess some implicit
structure that may be modified by resampling. Consider an image signal x(n1, n2)
whose DSFT is denoted by X(ω1, ω2). The Color Filter Array (CFA) is adopted
by most digital cameras for scene sampling. The CFA consists of array of color
sensors, each of which captures a corresponding color of the real-world scene at
an appropriate pixel location. After sampling, only one color is recorded at each
pixel location, and interpolation is performed to recover the lost color information.
The Bayer pattern and its variants are commonly used to determine the color to
be sensed at each location. Here we consider the green channel for illustration and












1 if (n1 + n2) is even,
0 otherwise.
(6.2)
Let r(n1, n2) represent the interpolation filter, then the relation between the ob-
tained image signal and the original scene can be expressed as
x(n1, n2) = [s(n1, n2)p(n1, n2)] ∗ r(n1, n2), (6.3)
and in the DSFT domain,
X(ω1, ω2) = [S(ω1, ω2) ∗ P (ω1, ω2)]R(ω1, ω2), (6.4)
in which P (ω1, ω2) consists of two impulses at (0, 0) and (π, π), respectively, in a
2π × 2π period. P (ω1, ω2) creates a high-frequency image at (π, π) which ideally
152
is eliminated by R(ω1, ω2). Note that the low-frequency gain of the interpolation
filter is 4/2 = 2 since in a 2× 2 grid two pixels will be interpolated from the other
two, that is, R(ω1, ω2) = 2 when ω1 and ω2 are small. It is well-known [73] that
the input-output relation of down-sampling by 2 both in the horizontal and vertical
directions in the DSFT domain is given by





































Assume that the first term dominates the rest in the region 0 ≤ ω1, ω2 ≤ π (that is,























[S(ω1, ω2) ∗ P (ω1, ω2)]R(ω1, ω2)
, 0 ≤ ω1, ω2 ≤ π.
(6.6)
We model the DSFT of a natural image using the power law decaying, which is










for some image-dependent constants A and α ≈ 1. For low frequencies, i.e., when ω1


























































when α ≈ 1. That is, the EFR for low frequencies is approximately constant. When
























) and R(ω1, ω2) and will be large. This is also valid when R(ω1, ω2)
significantly eliminates the high-frequency image of S(ω1, ω2) near (π, π). In general,
however, the behavior of the EFR for high frequencies of ω1 and ω2 depends more
on the choice of R(ω1, ω2) and is determined by the camera. Overall, the EFR of
down-sampling by 2 will have consistently low values near the low-frequency region,
and higher values around high frequencies, as can be observed in Fig. 6.1(b).
Resampling by a general L/M factor can also be analyzed in a similar manner.
In this case, we can decompose the resampling operation into the cascade of an up-
sampler, ↑ L, a low-pass filter F (ω1, ω2), and a down-sampler, ↓ M . Note again that
the filter F (ω1, ω2) behaves both as an interpolation filter and a decimation filter
and has a low-frequency gain of L2. Assuming that the aliasing can be ignored, we


























[S(ω1, ω2) ∗ P (ω1, ω2)]R(ω1, ω2)
, 0 ≤ ω1, ω2 ≤ π.
(6.9)







































And at higher frequencies, the camera-dependent functionR(ω1, ω2) and the resampling-
dependent function F (ω1, ω2) will determine the characteristics of the EFR. Just as
in the case of down-sampling by 2, the variations introduced by various cameras do
not mask the characteristics of the resampling operation, and thus it is possible to
identify the operation exploiting the EFR.
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6.2.2 The EFR for JPEG Compression
When an image is compressed by JPEG, it is first partitioned into a fixed
number of blocks (usually 8×8 or 16×16 pixels), and the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) is performed over each block. Each DCT coefficient is quantized into after
being divided by its corresponding entry in the quantization matrix then rounded to
the nearest integer value. The sequence of quantized DCT coefficients is rearranged
in the zig-zag order and losslessly compressed. Decompression is carried out in a
reverse order and yields the decompressed image block.
The quantization introduces spectral artifacts that can be manifested by the
EFR. First, JPEG compression tends to preserve the low-frequency components
by using smaller quantization steps for low-frequency coefficients, which results
in smaller quantization error at low frequencies in the DSFT domain. Since low-
frequency signal coefficients usually have larger magnitudes, the quantization error
will be ignorable compared to the signal magnitude at low frequencies, suggesting
that X(ω1, ω2) ≈ Y (ω1, ω2) and thus HX(ω1, ω2) ≈ 1. For high frequencies, large
quantization steps have the effect of destroying image details, that is, Y (ω1, ω2) ≈ 0,
and thus HX(ω1, ω2) ≈ 0. However, we notice that for certain high frequencies espe-
cially those along vertical and horizontal directions, JPEG may increase the resulting
coefficient magnitude and thus HX(ω1, ω2) > 1. This occurs when the quantization
error is too large to be ignored but still moderately independent of the signal coeffi-
cient. It can also be partially attributed to the rounding error when JPEG performs
conversion between floating numbers and integers.
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Combining these factors, the EFR of JPEG compression is expected to have
values close to unity (or 0 in the log scale) in the low-low frequency region, smaller
values in high-high frequency bands, and larger values in the low-high and high-low
bands, as is observed in Fig. 6.1(c).
6.2.3 The EFR for Median Filtering
We provide experimental observations about the EFR of median filtering, for
three representative cases of input images. First, if the input image has a flat
spectrum (i.e., if the input image is white-noise-like), a very strong resemblance
between the EFRs of median filtering and average filtering, that is, the sinc-like
structure, can be observed, as illustrated in Fig. 6.2(a) and 6.2(b). If a natural image
that obeys that power law decaying is used as the input, the central low-frequency
parts of the EFR essentially remain, but the mid-frequency and high-frequency
regions exhibit some different patterns, as shown by Fig. 6.1(d) and 6.2(c). The
resemblance between average filtering and median filtering for frequencies lower
than 2π/α, where α is the filter order, has been reported in [30]. Outside this
region, more high-frequency coefficients are retained to preserve the signal sharpness.
Lastly, if the input image is smooth (i.e., the spectrum only has small high-frequency
coefficients), the EFR have large magnitudes for certain mid-frequency coefficients,
but its resemblance to that of average filtering is not easily noticeable. We have
to remark that, also these EFR patterns are highly consistent in our experimental













































Figure 6.2: (a) 3 × 3 median filtering with white-noise input; (b) 7 × 7 median
filtering with white-noise input; (c) 7 × 7 median filtering with natural image as
input; (d) 3 × 3 median filtering with smooth image as input; (e) 7 × 7 median
filtering with smooth image as input.
established.
In the next section, we build upon our observation on the EFR consistency
across different tampering operations and present a framework for determining the
type of tampering operations.
6.3 Tampering Operation Analysis Using EFR
6.3.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, we study the performance of EFR in characterizing different
types of tampering operations. As demonstrated in Section 6.2, the EFR is a func-
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Table 6.1: Cameras used in our experiment
Brand Model Resolution
Canon PowerShot G7 3648× 2736
Canon PowerShot SD950 IS 4000× 3000
Sony CyberShot DSC-W80 3072× 2304
Sony CyberShot DSC V1 2048× 1536
Casio Exilim EX-Z9 3264× 2448
Fujifim FinePix E550 2848× 2136
Olympus C-5060 WZ 2048× 1536
tion of the tampering operation, the camera used, and to some extent dependent
on the nature of the input image for non-LSI systems. For example, in the case
of resampling, color interpolation coefficients and the low-pass filter are usually a
function of the camera and may vary among different camera models. In order to
take the effect of the camera into consideration, we employ a data set containing 7
cameras as listed in Table 6.1 in our experiments with 80 images from each camera.
We consider 16 types of manipulations listed in Table 6.2, including resam-
pling, LSI filtering, non-LSI filtering, JPEG compression, and a representative point
operation outside these categories. These 16 operations are also grouped into 6 em-
pirical categories consistent with signal-processing knowledge.
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Table 6.2: Tampering operations considered in our experiment
Category of Tampering Operation Configuration
(C1) down-sampling (O1) ↓ 2
(O2) ↓ 4
(O3) ↓ 2 by MATLAB’s built-in function imresize
(O6-O7) 3× 3 and 5× 5 average filtering followed by ↓ 2
(C2) up-sampling (O4) ↑ 2 by imresize (bicubic interpolation)
(O5) ↑ 1.5 by imresize (bicubic interpolation)
(C3) spatial filtering (O8-O11) 3× 3, 5× 5, 7× 7, and 9× 9 average filtering
(C4) non-linear filtering (O12-O13) 3× 3 and 7× 7 median filtering
(C5) compression (O14-O15) JPEG QF=60 and 80
(C6) point-wise operation (O16) histogram equalization
6.3.2 Robust EFR Estimation for Operation Characterization
We compute EFRs by extracting two corresponding 256 × 256 blocks from
the input and output images, and use the fixed-sized discrete Fourier transform
(DFT) to approximate the DSFT. To further reduce the variation within EFRs of
the same operation, we perform inverse filtering and Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD). Specifically, inverse filtering ensures that all spectral coefficients smaller
than a threshold value θ are replaced by θ to avoid numerical instability, and the
EFR is decomposed and reconstructed by means of SVD with only N0 singular value
components used. In our setting, θ = 0.01 and N0 = 20.
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For resampling operations that change the image sizes, we apply appropriate
zero padding in spatial domain to interpolate the frequency components. We pre-
process the EFRs by average filtering to reduce the effects of noise, and reduce
their dimensionality by first donwsampling it to size 64 × 64 and then by applying
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to produce 8 features per image.
6.3.3 Identifying the Tampering Type Exploiting EFR Consistency
Fig. 6.3 plots the 2-D principal-component projections of the EFRs for different
tampering operations. We notice from Fig. 6.3(a) that operations such as ↓ 2 and
3 × 3 average filtering exhibit strong inner-operation consistency with the features
forming very tight clusters.
The effect of cameras can be studied by capturing the same content using dif-
ferent cameras and examining the consistency of the EFR for different tampering
operations. Fig. 6.3(b) shows the 2-D projections of EFR subsets from two cameras
of two post-camera manipulations, namely, 7 × 7 median filtering and JPEG com-
pression with quality factor 80. We see from the figure that the features form four
small clusters, but those which belong to the same operation are much closer. This
is another level of EFR consistency but still justifies our choice of employing EFRs
for tampering type identification.
Lastly, the fact that the EFR partially depends on the input image content
as shown in Sec. 6.2.3 suggests a third level of EFR consistency. Fig. 6.3(c)
justifies our observation in Sec. 6.2.3 that EFRs corresponding to natural images
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and smooth images form two clusters close to each other. As long as representative
training data from each cluster are available, the distribution of the EFR can be
well estimated and thus the EFR can still be employed to identify the manipulation
type.
We now examine the classification performance using the EFR as features.
We employ Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) to learn each category and classify the
EFR based features using a Maximum-Likelihood (ML) approach. We use the same
image set that contains images from 7 cameras; each camera generates 80 images.
The 16 operations listed in Table 6.2 are performed on each image. Six image blocks
of size 256×256 pixels are then extracted randomly from each of the processed image,
and the total number of tampered image blocks is 53760. Note that, in reality, the
operations may be performed image-wise but only portions within the image are
available for tampering analysis.
We randomly sample 40 training images from each camera for training the
classifier and use the remaining images for testing, repeating this process for twenty
times to obtain the average performance. Table 6.3 shows the classification per-
formance using the 2-component ML-GMM approach in the form of a confusion
matrix. The average classification accuracy is 95.3% suggesting that the EFR can
efficiently discriminate between different types of tampering operations.
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Table 6.3: Confusion matrix with the original EFR.
% C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 99.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C2 0.9 99.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C3 0.0 0.0 91.2 7.4 1.2 0.2
C4 0.0 0.0 11.8 84.4 3.4 0.4
C5 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.0 94.3 0.4
C6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 3.2 95.8
6.4 Camera Model Identification Using EFR
As discussed in Sec. 6.2.1, the image signal obtained by a camera is partly
determined by the exact configuration of the CFA sampling and the interpolation
filter. As a result, the EFR of the down-sampling by 2 operation has a dependency
on the camera model since such a configuration is camera model specific, especially
around high-frequency locations. It is therefore implied that the EFR of ↓ 2 may
be used to distinguish betweeen different camera models.
We use the same set of images taken by 7 camera models to verify our hypoth-
esis. In our setting, the entire image will be used to calculate the EFR, which will
be further used as the feature for camera model classification. Since calculating the
Fourier transform over the entire image is highly computation-consuming, we divide
images into blocks of 512 × 512 pixels. Each block is down-sampled by 2 and we
denote the DFT of the ith block before and after ↓ 2 by Xi(ω1, ω2) and Yi(ω1, ω2),
respectively. Writing Yi(ω1, ω2) = H(ω1, ω2)Xi(ω1, ω2) +Ei(ω1, ω2) where H(ω1, ω2)
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stands for the ensemble average EFR of ↓ 2 and Ei(ω1, ω2) is the modeling inaccu-
racy, it can be seen that the maximum-likehood estimate of ‖H(ω1, ω2)‖ based on
N image blocks is given by
‖H(ω1, ω2)‖ML =
∑N





if the modeling inaccuracy Ei(ω1, ω2) is modeled as Gaussian with equal variance
across different i. Empirically, we find this estimate more reliable for camera model
identification than simple averaging over ‖Yi(ω1, ω2)Xi(ω1, ω2)
−1‖. The EFRs from
three color channels are stacked into a feature vector. We randomly select 70 images
from each cameras fortraining, and apply PCA to reduce the feature dimension to
32. The obtained 32-dimensional feature vector is linearly scaled so that the feature
value falls into [0, 1], and then fed into a 7-class support vector machine (SVM) with
a radial basis function kernel. This process is repeated for 500 times.
When the entire EFR is used for camera model classification, the average ac-
curacy of the 7-class classification is 97.40%, which suggests that the EFR of ↓ 2 can
effectively distinguish between different camera models. We also consider using low-
frequency and high-frequency regions of the EFR for camera model classification.
Specifically, two masks mL(ω1, ω2) and mH(ω1, ω2) are imposed upon the EFR to se-
lect the regions that will be used to form the raw feature vector. The two masks are









respectively, where 1 {·} is the indicator function, and RL and RH are selected
so that the two masks have equal sizes of support. With the low-frequency and
high-frequency regions selected exclusively for camera model classification, the ob-
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tained accuracies are 78.19% and 92.26%, respectively. This is consistent with our
observation in Sec. 6.2.1 that the high-frequency region of the EFR carries more
camera-dependent information.
6.5 Estimating EFR using Blind Deconvolution
In most applications involving tampering detection, the camera output (namely,
the system input) is not accessible and therefore the EFR of the system cannot be
readily determined. Nevertheless, blind deconvolution has been shown to be an ef-
fective means for estimating the frequency response of a system with only the output
signal [69], and in this work, we employ blind deconvoltuion to estimate the EFR.
In principle, any blind deconvolution algorithms that lead to reasonable esti-
mation results can be utilized [37]. We adopt here the one based on the Gaussian
prior described in [38]. Specifically, the DSFT of a natural image is modeled as
follows:






2 + C, (6.12)
for some normalization constant C. This model is not as accurate as certain alter-
natives such as the Laplacian prior [38], but is favored here because it can lead to
closed-form blind deconvolution solutions. The output of a system modeled as LSI
with frequency response H(ω1, ω2) is given by
Y (ω1, ω2) = H(ω1, ω2)X(ω1, ω2) +N(ω1, ω2), (6.13)
where N(ω1, ω2) stands for the inaccuracy of LSI system modeling and is modeled
as Gaussian with zero mean and variance η2. It can be derived that the output has
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the following distribution:




‖H(ω1, ω2)‖2σ2X(ω1, ω2) + η
2
‖Y (ω1, ω2)‖
2 + C ′, (6.14)
for another constant C ′. The maximum a posteriori probability estimate of ‖H(ω1, ω2)‖










Reference [38] has justified that blind deconvolution based on the Gaussian prior
provides a reasonable solution, and we use it here to estimate the EFR. We learn
σ2X(ω1, ω2) using a diverse set of 1200 images.
6.5.1 Classification using Estimated EFR and Block Fusion
We compare the classification performances of the original EFR and the es-
timated EFR. Table 6.4 shows the confusion matrix for the estimated EFR using
two-component ML-GMM. We notice from the table that the classification accuracy
with the estimated EFR is lower for certain manipulation categories compared with
the corresponding results obtained with the original EFR reported in Table 6.3.
Nevertheless, different categories can still be differentiated effectively using the es-
timated EFR with an accuracy close to 88.1%, suggesting that the estimation is
effective. Further, the fact that a reasonably high accuracy is retained is an indi-
cator that the traces for identifying the tampering are well preserved in the output
image, an observation in line with today’s blind image forensic research.
As an image is divided into blocks for forensic analysis, some of the blocks may
be largely smooth. Such block may have its power concentrated on low-frequency
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spectral coefficients, and as a result, the EFR estimate for the high-frequency region
may appear more noisy. Besides using the robust technique such as SVD described
in Sec. 6.3.2 to alleviate such estimation noise, another option is to remove in
advance these smooth blocks. We do so by calculating the average Sobel gradient
magnitude of each manipulated block, and only keep those blocks with gradient
magnitude larger than a threshold gT which we choose as 10 here. We find that
smooth blocks can be effectively identified even if the Sobel operator is conducted
after the image is considerbly smoothened. The corresponding confusion matrix is
given in Table 6.5, and we can see that the per-category accuracy is increased after
smooth blocks are filtered out, and the average accuracy increases by about 3% to
91.0%.
As discussed above, the EFR depends both on the camera and the image con-
tent. Such dependence is not desired since it lowers the inner-operation consistency.
In this part, we introduce multi-block fusion as a possible means to alleviate such
Table 6.4: Confusion matrix with the estimated EFR.
% C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 93.5 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.9
C2 0.6 94.1 0.5 2.9 1.9 0.1
C3 0.4 0.3 95.3 3.7 0.2 0.1
C4 1.9 2.3 8.6 85.2 1.2 0.8
C5 6.4 2.7 0.8 1.0 83.9 5.3
C6 11.0 0.3 0.9 1.7 9.5 76.6
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Table 6.5: Confusion matrix with the estimated EFR. Smooth image blocks are
removed.
% C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 93.3 0.1 0.4 1.2 2.8 2.2
C2 0.3 96.8 0.0 1.2 1.7 0.0
C3 0.4 0.1 99.0 0.5 0.1 0.0
C4 1.6 1.4 1.4 93.8 0.9 0.9
C5 6.0 1.2 0.5 1.2 86.1 4.9
C6 11.5 0.0 0.0 1.1 10.1 77.2
dependency. Assuming that the entire image or a certain significant portion of it
undergoes the same operation, we can fuse evidence from more than one block to
jointly determine the manipulation type.
We adopt the näıve Bayes classifier which assumes that each block of the total
N blocks is independent, and the a posteriori probability can be written as





where Ci is the ith category, Fj is the estimated EFR of the jth block. Using the
two-component GMM to model P (Fj|Ci), the confusion matrix is shown in Table 6.6.
Multi-block fusion improves the average classification accuracy to 97.7%.
6.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduce the Empirical Frequency Response (EFR) as a
highly universal descriptor for digital tampering operations. We find that many LSI
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and non-LSI operations exhibit consistencies in the EFR, and therefore the EFR
can be utilized to identify tampering operations when the input and output of the
tampering module are known. Our results indicate that the proposed EFR based
features can classify six categories of tampering with an accuracy of 95.3%. In sce-
narios where the system input is not available, we show that the EFR can still be
estimated just based on the output data, and used for tampering identification with
an accuracy of 88.0%; which can be further improved to 97.7% by removing smooth
blocks and fusing multiple blocks. Experimental results supported by theoretical
reasoning demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Besides tamper-
ing analysis, we also demonstrate that different properties of the EFR can be used
for other forensic applications, such as camera model identification.
Table 6.6: Confusion matrix with the estimated EFR. Non-smooth image blocks in
the same image are used jointly to estimate the EFR.
% C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6
C1 98.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9
C2 0.5 99.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
C3 0.2 0.0 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
C4 0.4 0.0 0.2 99.2 0.1 0.0
C5 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 96.4 2.6
C6 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 92.9
168








3 × 3 average
(a) ↓ 2 and 3× 3 average










C1 median C2 median C1 JPEG C2 JPEG
(b) 7× 7 median and JPEG QF=80










median with natural image as input
median with smooth image as input
(c) 7× 7 median with two types of content
Figure 6.3: Plots showing the 2-D projection of the EFR for (a) down-sampling and
average filtering, (b) median filtering and JPEG compression across two different
cameras (denoted by C1 and C2), (c) median filtering with two types of content.
169
CHAPTER 7
Conclusions and Future Perspectives
In this dissertation, we have considered the resiliency of intrinsic fingerprinting
and addressed important resiliency issues that arise in real-world intrinsic finger-
printing systems. As we have seen in this dissertation, unfavorable conditions are
common, and many current intrinsic fingerprinting that have been designed without
awareness of resiliency can easily fail under these conditions or suffer from serious
performance degradation. To the best of our knowledge, this dissertation is among
the first works that call for explicit efforts to deal with resiliency issues of intrinsic
fingerprinting. Upon assessing in depth the vulnerabilities in today’s systems, we
investigate promising algorithmic solutions to enhancing the resiliency of intrinsic
fingerprinting.
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Resilience against Content Dependency and Post-processing: First, we
consider the content dependency of camera model identification based on color in-
terpolation identification. Our statistical study has shown that the prior schemes
exhibit a substantial dependency on the image content. Such dependency can limit
the achievable identification performance, which can be further penalized if there
exists a mismatch between the training and testing image content. Our study devel-
ops profiles that can be used to quantitatively represent the image content, and we
propose static and adaptive schemes for selecting training images that fit the content
of the testing image. Our experimental results show that by incorporate the notion
of content-awareness, the proposed schemes outperform blind schemes and therefore
effectively mitigate content dependency and improve the forensic performance.
An interesting research dimension that we plan to investigate next is how to
reduce the complexity of image data collection. In our current setting, we assume
that a super set of training images is collected for each camera model that is to be
identified. In fact, in the entire training process, the collection of training data may
demand more time than the execution of the subsequent camera model identification
process, and it is of practical interest if one can reduce the time for data collection
such as for field use outside full-capacity forensic laboratories. We have begun to
consider possible low-complexity training scenarios, including training using printed
images and LCD-displayed images. For both cases, we use a digital single-lens reflex
camera Canon Rebel T1i to capture a super set of sample images. When training
using printed images, we print the sample images at a high resolution (1200 dpi) and
use the two cell-phone cameras, a Nokia 6650d model and an Apple iPhone 4 model
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to retake the training images. The primary difference between the two cell-phone
cameras is that the iPhone 4 has an improved short-distance capture capability. As
we set the operating false identification rate that a non-targeted camer model is mis-
identified as the targeted model at 0%, the identification rate associated with Nokia
6650d is 5.8%, whereas the detection rate associated with Apple iPhone 4 reaches
84.2%. These preliminary results suggest that if cameras with short-distance capture
capability are available, then printed images can be employed to provide a reasonable
identification accuracy with a reduced data collection complexity, otherwise the
forensic performance could be severely limited. When training using LCD-displayed
images, the sample images are displayed on a 19” LCD screen and the two cell-
phone camera models are used in the same way. With the same false identification
rate, however, the true identification rates for Nokia 6650d and Apple iPhone 4 are
11.7% and 0%, respectively. An issue with training using displayed images, which
has also been found in recent literature [9], is that visible textural patterns can be
introduced in recaptured LCD images in the display and recapturing process. It
remains challenging how to resolve the effects of such patterns that may bias the
color interpolation coefficient estimation.
We also plan to investigate more aspects of the proposed content-aware method-
ology. For example, are there better ways to integrate the two proposed profiles to
improve their representation power? In addition to our proposed profiles, are there
other intermediate representations of the image content that can fit a particular
identification task? Ultimately, as content dependency is a common issue that can
occur in other identification techniques, we believe that the content awareness will
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have a broader impact, and more forensic tasks can benefit from this design method-
ology.
The second resiliency issue considered in this dissertation is the post-processing
that can take place posterior to the processing module to be identified. When the
post-processing becomes strong, it has to be dealt with explicitly. Specifically, we
consider in this dissertation the camera identification using imaging noise extracted
from low-bit-rate videos. We show that while the compression can significantly
distort the extracted noise and reduce the identification accuracy, our proposed
frame reordering and unequal weighting can nonetheless leverage the difference in
the compression level between different frame types to improve the identification
with fewer frames used.
So far, we have mainly considered a hard separation of I and P frames, and
assigned weights to each respectively. The optimal strategy for frame reliability es-
timation will be an interesting direction to be explored. One immediate possibility
is to relate the reliability to the PSNR of each video frame, since PSNR carries
information about the compression level. The capability of no-reference PSNR esti-
mation [7] will be necessary. It is also beneficial to examine further the underlying
reasons that cause the difference in frame PSNR as well as the identification relia-
bility.
Another intriguing direction is to explore the relation between PRNUs as-
sociated with different resolutions. In particular, most of today’s digital cameras
support both image and video outputs, using the same array of sensor. Since videos
usually have a smaller resolution than images, some kind of down-sizing of the whole
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sensor output values must be used. It has been observed that the aspect ratios of the
image and video outputs are usually different, which implies that extra cropping is
also involved. We are interested in understanding the internal resizing mechanism of
a camera when only a completely or semi non-intrusive approach can be employed.
The knowledge of the internal resizing as well as cropping may be helpful in devel-
oping effective forensic techniques for resized signals. For example, as digital images
often undergo less severe compression than videos on the same camera, the PRNU
pattern extracted from images may be more reliable. So if the mapping between
images and videos associated with the same camera can be established, then we an-
ticipate that a high-quality PRNU pattern extracted from images can be remapped
to identify video frames and achieve a higher accuracy.
Resilience against Anti-Forensics: As there are always adversaries who have
the incentives to counteract forensic investigations, we then study another resiliency
aspect of intrinsic fingerprinting: how well it can resist anti-forensics. Two practi-
cal intrinsic fingerprinting schemes are considered for this study. First, we propose
anti-forensic techniques, referred to as parameter perturbation and algorithm mix-
ing, which aim at circumventing and misleading forensic identification of color inter-
polation algorithms, respectively. Both techniques can be applied to a wide range
of color interpolation algorithms. Parameter perturbation is particularly power-
ful when interpolation involves direction classification, which is very common in
advanced interpolation algorithms. Our investigation of algorithm mixing, on the
other hand, shows that linearly mixing interpolated pixels from two independent
174
interpolation algorithms can not only reduce the identification performance but also
preserve the image quality. Our study sheds light on the inherent vulnerabilities of
current color interpolation identification systems, which further motivate counter-
measures as well as adjustments of anti-forensics. We characterize such an interac-
tion as a color interpolation identification game, and derive the optimal strategies
for forensic analysts and adversaries using game-theoretic techniques.
We also study the anti-forensics resiliency of a recent forensic technique based
on electrical network frequency (ENF) analysis that can determine the creation time
of digital recordings. This technique detects the frequency fluctuations of the ENF
signal and compares the fluctuations to the references measured at the power net-
work to determine the creation time and region. Our work is the first that examines
plausible anti-forensic operations that can manipulate the ENF signal and the cor-
responding space-time information. We also establish a mathematical framework
for ENF anti-forensics to understand its detectability, which motivates detection
schemes such as inter-frequency consistency and spectrogram consistency checks as
well as improved anti-forensics via envelope adjustment based on Hilbert Transform.
We characterize the dynamic interplay between forensic analysts and adversaries
using an evolutionary perspective and a game-theoretic perspective, and provide
quantitative studies of representative scenarios and derive the optimal strategies.
As far as we know, our study of ENF anti-forensics is the first work in this
research direction. In light of the potential deployment of the ENF-based forensic
techniques, we envision that as more upcoming anti-forensics and countermeasures
are to appear, our framework can help understand and analyze these advancements.
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A fundamentally important goal of ENF and anti-ENF research is to obtain an
improved understanding of the formation mechanism of the ENF signal. Such an
understanding will facilitate the characterization of current techniques, and lead to
more sophisticated forensic and anti-forensic methods.
Anti-forensics in itself is a subject that has much more to explore. On one
hand, it is important to examine the performance of more forensic techniques un-
der adversarial settings, and seek feasible improvements that can address identified
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, studies of individual techniques may lead to
a holistic understanding of anti-forensics and countermeasures, and we anticipate
that more comprehensive theoretical frameworks can be established as well. Read-
ers who are interested in other case studies and relevant discussions of anti-forensics
can refer to [35, 61].
Universal Identification of Intrinsic Fingerprints: Our study of the empirical
frequency response (EFR) provides a new way to address another resiliency aspect
of intrinsic fingerprinting: to identify operations in a (nearly) universal manner. So
far, we have considered linear shift-invariant (LSI) operations as well some other
non-LSI operations, such as resampling, compression, non-linear filtering, and even
some point-wise operations. While different types of operations may have different
levels of consistency in terms of their EFR representations, we find that the EFR is
highly discriminative in separating different operation categories, and also promising
for operations that are within the same category but have different parameters.
An interesting research issue that remains to be better understood is on
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whether more operations exhibit EFR consistency, under what conditions and to
what extent. In practice, multiple operations may form a chain, and it is still
an open question in a general setting how the EFR corresponding to the entire
processing chain is related to EFRs of individual operations. As we employ blind
deconvolution to estimate the EFR when the input image is unavailable, how the
EFR estimation depends on the accuracy of blind deconvolution is also an inter-
esting research issue. Exploring such issues will lead to a deeper understanding of
the EFR. Finally, the recent notion of forensic hash [42] aims at attaching compact
side information to digital images to assist forensic tasks beyond tampering detec-
tion. Since the EFR offers the capability of characterizing LSI and certain non-LSI
operations, it has the potential to serve as a representation component that can
be combined into the framework of forensic hash to support finer identification of
processing history.
Systematic Framework: As this dissertation studies important issues that must
be considered in the real-world use of intrinsic fingerprinting, continued effort should
be devoted to a systematic framework for the fingerprint resiliency. Toward this
end, proper definitions for resiliency that can be measured quantitatively can be
established, accompanied by a resiliency evaluation methodology that examines
comprehensively how a given fingerprinting scheme performs under various testing
conditions and in the presence of adversaries. A goal of resilient intrinsic finger-
printing is to devise fingerprint extraction and matching methods that are invariant
or insensitive to deviations of operational conditions. One example concerns visual
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signals whose derived fingerprints may be different if the signals’ spatial resolution
is changed. Since most of todays digital cameras support outputs of multiple reso-
lutions and resizing is a common content-preserving operation, it is highly desirable
if intrinsic traces extracted at different resolutions could be properly matched to
one another. The resiliency framework can benefit from the theoretical framework
of component forensics [70], which has modeled different identification settings of
digital devices and derived corresponding identification performances. We expect
that in a signal processing chain where a component’s effects may be masked by
subsequent components, the identification resiliency of the particular component
can be evaluated using existing results from component forensics. Finally, it is of
interest to see if anti-forensics can be incorporated into the framework.
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